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CALMING AIDS PHOBIA:
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE LOW RISK
OF TRANSMITTING HIV IN THE HEALTH
CARE SETTING
American Bar Association AIDS Coordinating Committee t
Edited by Eric N. Richardson* and Salvatore J. Russo**
Scientists are concluding that the risk of becoming infected with
the virus that causes AIDS based on transmission from an infected health care worker is infinitesimal: in fact, only one health
care worker has ever been documented as the source of HN transmission to a patient. This Article sets forth the medical evidence
concerning this low risk and argues that legal decision making
should incorporate these facts into its analysis of legal problems
involving HN-infected health care workers. The Article analyzes
three areas of such legal decision making: (1) employment and
related credentialling of HN-infected health care workers; (2)
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liability of such workers to their patients for fear of contracting
AIDS, including liability under doctrines of informed consent;
and (3) insurance issues involving health care workers and HIVrelated risks. In all three areas, the Article concludes that the law
lags behind science and has not yet incorporated the facts about
the low risk of HIV transmission into its treatment of HIV-infected health care workers. Until courts and legislatures recognize
the scientific facts about the low risk of HIV transmission and
incorporate them into cases and statutes, HIV-infected health care
workers are likely to suffer unnecessary discrimination and other
mistreatment.
!

INTRODUCTION

Between July 1990 and May 1993, the United States Centers for Disease Control (CDC) disclosed that six patients
likely had become infected with the human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV) while receiving treatment at the offices of David
Acer, a Florida dentist. 1 These reports propelled public concerns about contracting HIV in the health care setting to the
very top of the AIDS agenda, generating both much-needed
attention and potentially damaging public fear and hysteria. 2
The anomaly of the Acer cluster3 has puzzled medical scien-

1.
See Centers for Disease Control, Update: Investigations of Persons Treated
by HIV-Infected Health-Care Workers, 42 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 329
(1993) [hereinafter CDC, Investigations of Persons Treated]; Centers for Disease
Control, Update: Transmission of HIV Infection During an Invasive Dental Procedure-Florida, 40 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 21 (1991) [hereinafter CDC,
Transmission of HIV Infection-Florida]; Centers for Disease Control, Possible
Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus to a Patient During an Invasive
Dental Procedure, 39 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 489 (1990) [hereinafter
CDC, Possible Transmission of HIV].
2.
See, e.g., Mike Clary, Florida's Dilemma with AIDS Stirs National Attention, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 1991, at A21 (stating that "in the midst of an epidemic
that has now spread into every corner of American life, that one [Florida) case has
made all the difference" in catapulting the state of Florida into the national health
care spotlight); Phillip J. Hilts, Congress Urges That Doctors Be Tested for AIDS,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1991, at A18 (describing a bill approved by Congress that
"suggests but does not require that doctors and other health care workers be tested
for the AIDS virus"); cf Sanford F. Kuvin, A Proactive Public Health Policy for the
Mandatory Testing of Health Care Workers and Patients Involved in Invasive
Procedures, 2 CTS. HEALTH SCI. & L. 115 (1991) (advocating that "public health
officials and the medical profession must be at the forefront of developing a proactive public health policy to prevent the spread of infections between health care
providers and patients").
3.
The term "cluster" refers to a group of patients who were infected by
exposure to one health care worker. See Centers for Disease Control, Recommendations for Preventing Transmissions of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis
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tists since its first report. 4 No one has ever documented any
other case of HIV transmission from health care worker to
patient, despite diligent searches including a host of "lookback" studies 5 conducted with respect to surgeons who performed highly invasive procedures after they had become
HIV-positive. 6
While the issue of health care workers with HIV has receded from the public consciousness somewhat since the discovery of the last case in the Acer cluster, 7 recent events have
renewed interest in the topic. In October 1995, the only
remaining lawsuit brought by one of Dr. Acer's patients was
settled without a trial, bringing to an end the legal battles
that arose out of the infections traced to Dr. Acer's practice. 8
But interest in the legal and policy issues illuminated by the
Acer cluster remains strong. Most notably, proposals for
mandatory HIV testing of pregnant women and their babies 9
raise many of the same medical, legal, and policy issues as
earlier proposals for mandatory testing of health care workers. As in the debate over mandatory testing of health care
workers, 10 policymakers considering mandatory testing of
pregnant women must balance the benefits of knowledge of
HIV status with the risks of driving people away from the
health care system. Fear of HIV and discrimination against
those who are-or are perceived to be-infected increases

B Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, 40 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP, 2, 2-3 (1991) [hereinafter CDC Guidelines).
4.
See, e.g., Dennis L. Breo, The Dental AIDS Cases-Murder or an Unsolvable
Mystery?, 270 JAMA 2732, 2732 (1993) (quoting an epidemiologist who described the
Acer cluster, "I don't know what happened and we may never know what happei;ied.").
5.
"Look-back" studies are studies in which the researcher contacts former
patients of a health care worker who has AIDS to determine whether these patients
have been infected with the HIV virus.
6.
See Barry Sullivan, When the Environment Is Other People: An Essay on
Science, Culture, and the Authoritative Allocation of Values, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
597, 623 n.59 (1994).
7.
See CDC, Investigations of Persons Treated, supra note 1, at 331.
8.
Pat Moore, RN-Infected Patient Settles Dispute Against Dentist's Estate,
PALM BEACH POST, Oct. 25, 1995, at lB.
9.
See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. Sl0,701 (daily ed. July 26, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Kassebaum); see also H.R. 1872, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (aiming to
reduce the number of HIV infections passed from mother to infant through counseling and voluntary testing of pregnant women); Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory NonAnonymous Testing of Newborns for HIV: Should It Ever Be Allowed?, 27 J.
MARsHALL L. REV. 373, 373 (1994) (discussing attempts to enact legislation
requiring mandatory testing of newborns for HIV on a non-anonymous basis).
10.
Clary, supra note 2, at A21.
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because of excessive focus on mandatory testing to the
exclusion of accurate public education about the true risks of
HIV infection. As a result, it now seems appropriate to renew
the conversatipn about HIV and the health care worker in a
dispassionate way, while also broadening the focus of that
conversation.
This Article constitutes the American Bar Association (ABA)
AIDS Coordinating Committee's contribution to that end.
Since its first meeting in January 1988, the AIDS Coordinating Committee of the ABA has sought to contribute in a
constructive and dispassionate way to the public conversation
concerning the legal and public policy issues raised by the
AIDS epidemic and to facilitate legal representation of persons affected by HIV. 11 This Article represents the latest in
that series of efforts and builds upon hearings held by the
Committee in 1992 in both Washington, D.C. and Chicago on
the issue of HIV testing of health care workers. 12
11.
See, e.g., William A. Bradford, Jr. et al., The AIDS Epidemic and Health
Care Reform, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 279, 291-314 (1994) (discussing problems for
patients with AIDS in obtaining treatment and insurance coverage); Barry Sullivan,
AIDS: Law, Public Policy, and the Continuing Work of the American Bar Association, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 273 (1994) (discussing work of the Committee and
introducing an article on AIDS and health care reform) [hereinafter Sullivan, AIDS
Law]; Barry Sullivan, AIDS: Law, Public Policy, and the Work of the American Bar
Association, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. 1 (1989) (discussing the ABA's policy statements
and reports concerning AIDS and the legal community); AIDS COORDINATING
COMM., AMERICAN BAR AsS'N, AIDS: THE LEGAL ISSUES (Aug. 1988) (describing the
responsibilities of the AIDS Coordinating Committee as "coordinating the [ABA's]
ongoing AIDS-related activities, with acting as a catalyst to stimulate new activities, and with identifying issues for future policy development"). For information on
the Committee's work in fostering pro bone representation of people with HIV, see
AIDS COORDINATION PROJECT, AMERICAN BAR AsS'N, CREATING A PRO BONO PROJECT FOR PEOPLE WITH AIDS & HIV: A MANUAL ON How TO START AND MANAGE A
PRO BONO LEGAL PROGRAM FOR PEOPLE WITH AIDS AND HIV (Michele A. Zavos ed.',
1993) AIDS COORDINATION PROJECT, AMERICAN BAR AsS'N, DIRECTORY OF LEGAL
RESOURCES FOR PEOPLE WITH AIDS & HIV (Michele Zavos ed., 1991) (providing
information on how to develop and run a mostly volunteer AIDS/HIV legal program)
and AIDS COORDINATION PROJECT, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, DIRECTORY OF LEGAL
RESOURCES FOR PEOPLE WITH AIDS & HIV (Michele Zavos ed., 1991) (listing by
state legal aid programs specializing in HIV issues).
12.
AIDS Coordinating Comm., American Bar Ass'n, Hearings on HIV Testing
of Health Care Workers: Briefing Book (Mar. 27, 1992) [hereinafter ABA, Chicago
Briefing Book] (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform);
Transcript of AIDS Coordinating Comm., American Bar Ass'n, Hearing re: HIV
Positive Health Care Workers (Mar. 27, 1992) [hereinafter ABA, Chicago Hearing]
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); AIDS Coordinating
Comm., American Bar Ass'n, Hearings on HIV Testing of Health Care Workers:
Briefing Book (Feb. 7, 1992) [hereinafter ABA, Washington Briefing Book] (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Transcript of AIDS
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After providing some background information about the low'
risks of HIV transmission in the health care setting and the
guidelines issued by the CDC in response to those risks, this
Article addresses legal developments in three areas: employment of HIV-infected health care workers; the professional
relationship between HIV-infected health care workers and
their patients; and insurance issues for HIV-infected health
care workers. The Article emphasizes the low risk that HIV
would be transmitted to a patient from a health care worker
who follows proper infection control procedures. As a result,
this Article argues that it is unwise and unnecessary to restrict the job performance of such health care workers, to
require disclosure of their HIV status, to discriminate against
them in their employ"ee benefits, or for the law otherwise to
penalize them for their HIV infection. This Article concludes
that to disadvantage by legal means HIV-positive health care
workers only fosters irrational fears of HIV and AIDS while
doing nothing to resolve the public health problems which the
AIDS epidemic has produced. 13
I. BACKGROUND CONCERNING AIDS AND
HEALTH CARE WORKERS

A. The Scope of the AIDS Epidemic and Infection
of Health Care Workers.
As of July 1, 1995, a cumulative total of 1,169,811 cases of
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) had been reported worldwide to the World Health Organization (WH0). 14
This represents a nineteen percent increase over the number

Coordinating Committee, American Bar Ass'n, Hearing on HIV Testing in the
Health Care Setting (Feb. 7, 1992) [hereinafter ABA, Washington Hearing) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
13.
Public ignorance of the true risks of HIV transmission often results in
discrimination based on HIV status. At times, this discrimination can result in
those with AIDS and HIV receiving poor or no medical care. Cf D.B. v. Bloom, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11867, at *15-*16 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 1995) (involving an instance in
which a patient was told by a dentist to leave and obtain care elsewhere due to the
patient's HIV condition).
14.
Telephone Interview with Dr. Fernando Zacarias, Coordinator, Regional
Program on HIV/AIDS Standards, Pan American Health Organization (Nov. 13,
1995).
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' of cases reported in July 1994. 15 In addition, the WHO estimates that 19.5 million persons have been infected with the
HIV virus since the start of the AIDS epidemic. 16 By 1993,
HIV had become the leading cause of death among people in
the United States between twenty-five and forty-four years of
age, surpassing all other diseases-, automobile accidents, and
gun violence. 17 As of June 1995, 295,473 individuals had died
of AIDS in the United States. 18 By June 1995, 476,899 cumulative AIDS cases had been reported in the United States. 19
Further, the incidence of HIV infection is significantly higher
than the reported number of AIDS cases; CDC e'stimates that
at least one million Americans, or one in every 250 persons,
are currently infected. 20
Of this overwhelming total, only forty-six documented AIDS
cases (0.03% of the total) had resulted from transmission of the
HIV virus from patients to health care workers as of June
1995. 21 Of the persons with AIDS in the United States reported
to the CDC through December 31, 1994, 14,591 had been
employed in the health care industry. 22 Health care workers
represent almost five percent of the AIDS cases for which occupational information is known by CDC. 23
In November 1993, CDC reported the following information
about the transmission and occurrence of HIV in the health
care setting:

15.
Id.
16.
Id. The AIDS epidemic began in the late 1970s, and its outbreak in the
United States was first recognized in an announcement by the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) in June 1981. 42 CDC MONTHLY VITAL STAT. REP. 18-20 (Oct. 1994)
(providing the Annual Summary of Births, Marriages, Divorces and Deaths: United
States, 1993).
17.
42 CDC MONTHLY VITAL STAT. REP. 18-20 (Oct. 1994).
18.
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
7 CDC HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REP. 14 (mid-year ed. 1995) (tabulations· by
editors) [hereinafter HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT).
19.
Id. at 3, 5.
20.
See David Horgan, AIDS Top Cause of Death for Americans Ages 25-44,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 1, 1995, at 26.
21.
Id. at 15. Only the six Acer cases involved transmission of HIV from a health
care worker to a patient. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
22.
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, FACTS ABOUT HIV/AIDS
AND HEALTH CARE WORKERS 1 (1995) (on file with the University ofMichigan Journal
of Law Reform).
23.
Id. To the extent that the CDC knows the specific health care occupations of
persons with AIDS, the numbers break down as follows: nurses (3256 cases), health
aides (2831), technicians (2011), physicians (1287), therapists (719), dental workers
(365), paramedics (283), and surgeons (90). Id.
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CDC is aware of 42 health care workers in the United
States who have been documented as having seroconverted
to HIV following occupational exposures. Fifteen have
developed AIDS. These individuals who seroconverted
include 17 laboratory workers (15 of whom were clinical
laboratory workers), 13 nurses, 6 physicians, 2 surgical
technicians, 1 dialysis technician, 1 respiratory therapist,
1 health aide, and 1 housekeeper/maintenance worker. The
exposures were as follows: 36 had percutaneous (puncture/cut injury exposure), 4 had mucocutaneous (mucous
membrane and/or skin) exposure, 1 had both percutaneous
and mucocutaneous exposure, and 1 had an unknown route
of exposure. Thirty-eight exposures were to HIV-infected
blood, 2 to concentrated virus in a laboratory, 1 to visibly
bloody fluid, and 1 to an unspecified fluid.
CDC is also aware of 91 other cases of HIV infection or
AIDS among health-care workers who have not reported
other risk factors for HIV infection and who report a
history of occupational exposure to blood, body fluids, or
HIV-infected laboratory material, but for whom seroconversion after exposure was not documented. The number
of these workers who acquired their infection through
occupational exposures is unknown. 24
Since that time, even more health care workers likely have
become infected. 25

B. Risk of HN Transmission in the Health Care Setting
Experts on HIV transmission believe that a risk of HIV
transmission from health care worker to patient could exist
only in situations where there exists both: (1) a high degree of
trauma to the patient that would provide a portal of entry for

24. Id. Seroconversion is the development of antibody response to a disease or
vaccine. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1300 (4th ed. 1981). In the context
of HIV, a patient has seroconverted when her blood tests HIV-positive, thus proving
that she has been invaded by and.has had an immunological experience with HIV.
See also infra note 71 and accompanying text (describing the "window period" between
infection and appearance of HIV antibodies).
25. See CDC HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 18, at 15.
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the virus (e.g., during invasive procedures); and (2) presence
of blood or other bodily fluid from open tissue of the health
care worker, as might occur ifthe health care worker sustained
a needle stick or scalpel injury during an invasive procedure. 26
HIV transmission in the opposite direction, from patient to
health care worker, has occurred when a health care worker
was exposed to HIV-infected blood through percutaneous
exposures (e.g., needle sticks, scalpel lacerations) or mucous
membrane exposures. 27
The risk of transmission from health care worker to patient
is far lower than the risk of HIV transmission from patient to
health care worker. While there has been only one cluster of
HIV infection apparently transmitted from a health care
worker to a patient, 28 there have been more than forty published reports of HIV transmission from patients to health care

26.
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
Summary: Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Infection with Human
T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III I Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus in the Workplace,
34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 681, 690 (1985). The CDC has defined the
term "invasive procedure" as "surgical entry into tissues, cavities, or organs or repair
of major traumatic injuries associated with any of the following:
(1) an operating or delivery room, emergency department or outpatient setting,
including both physicians' and dentists' offices; (2) cardiac catheterization and
angiographic procedures; (3) a vaginal or cesarean delivery or other invasive
obstetric procedure during which bleeding may occur; or (4) the manipulation,
cutting, or removal of any oral or perioral tissues, including tooth structure,
during which bleeding occurs or the potential for bleeding exists.

CDC Guidelines, supra note 3, at 9. The CDC Guidelines also define the phrase
"exposure-prone invasive procedures" as "certain invasive surgical and dental
procedures ... implicated in the transmission of [Hepatitis Bl from infected [health
care workers] to patients" and as percutaneous exposures of patients during surgery
which are thought to present a greater risk of HIV transmission than other invasive
procedures. Id. at 4. The CDC Guidelines further describe exposure-prone procedures
as follows:
Characteristics of exposure-prone procedures include digital palpation ofa needle
tip in a body cavity or the simultaneous presence of the [health care worker's]
fingers and a needle or other sharp instrument or object in a poorly visualized
or highly confined anatomic site. Performance of exposure-prone procedures
presents a recognized risk of percutaneous injury to the [health care worker],
and-if such an injury occurs-the [health care worker's] blood is likely to contact
the patient's body cavity, subcutaneous tissues and/or mucous membranes.

Id.
27.
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS, ADVISORY STATEMENT: HIVINFECTED ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS 1 (1991), reprinted in ABA, Chicago Briefing Book;
supra note 12, pt. 1.
28.
See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text; infra Part l.C.
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workers. 29 A major study of occupational HIV exposure showed
that approximately 0.32%, or 3 out of every 1000 health care
workers e~posed to HIV-infected blood by needle stick, will
become infected. 30
Due to the small number of reported cases, it is difficult to
quantify the risk of HIV transmission from health care workers
to patients, but in any event, the risk is probably very small.
For example, the New York State Department of Health
reported that the probability of HIV transmission from an
infected health care worker to a patient during an invasive
procedure has been estimated to be between 1per100,000 and
1 per 1,000,000 procedures. 31 On January 30, 1991, the CDC
released its own estimates of this risk based on: "The number
of surgeons and dentists with the virus, the number of
procedures they perform, the number of accidents in which
protective barriers are breached, and the probabilities of such
accidents resulting in an infection."32 Using this method, the
CDC estimated that between 13 and 128 patients may have
been infected with HIV by HIV-infected doctors and dentists
during invasive surgical procedures since 1981. 33 Based on the
estimates of the CDC and others, the risk of HIV transmission
to a patient from a seriously invasive procedure may be in the
range of 1 in 40,000 to 1 in 400,000. 34
In a subsequent report, the CDC presented a preliminary
estimate suggesting that up to twenty-eight surgical patients
could have been infected by invasive procedures performed by

29.
CDC, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 18, at 15.
30. E.g., AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS, supra note 27, at 1;
Kathryn A. Phillips et al., The Cost·Effectiveness of HN Testing of Physicians and
Dentists in the United States, 271 JAMA 851, 853 (1994).
31.
NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, POLICY STATEMENT AND GUIDELINES:
HEALTHCARE FACILITIES & HIV-INFECTED MEDICAL PERSONNEL 3 (Jan. 1991) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
32.
Mike Thomas, The Danger Zone: Fear and Doubt Grow Among Besieged
Health-Care Workers as More Central, Floridians Are Overcome with AIDS, ORLANDO
SENTINEL TRIB., Mar. 31, 1991, at 8.
33.
Id. See also Michael Kinsley, Red Peril: Congress Wastes Time on Doctors with
AIDS Issue, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 12, 1991, at 4 (citing the same CDC statistic, and
indicating that CDC estimated that 10 to 100 people had been infected by dentists
and that 3 to 28 people had been infected by surgeons).
34.
Larry Gostin, CDC Guidelines on HN or HBV-Positive Health Care Professionals Performing Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, 19 LAW, MED. & HEALTH
CARE 140, 141 (1991) (citing M.D. Hagen et al., Routine Pre-Operative Screening for
HN: Does the Risk to the Surgeon Outweigh the Risk to the Patient?, 259 JAMA 1357
(1988)); Larry Gostin, RN-Infected Physicians and the Practice of Seriously Invasive
Procedures, 19 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 32 (1989).
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infected surgeons since the AIDS epidemic began. 35 Based on
that estimate, a patient undergoing an invasive surgical procedure performed by an infected surgeon has a risk of infection
of between 2.4 to 24 per million. 36 Given the data currently
available, the highest estimated probability of an HIV-infected
dentist transmitting HIV to a patient is .038 per million. 37 .
To put these risks in proper perspective, one should.compare
them to other risks patients face in the health care system. For
example, one hundred out of every million persons undergoing
general anesthesia die and ten to twenty out of every million
persons treated with penicillin have an adverse (anaphylactic)
reaction resulting in death. 38 Given this data concerning risks,
the degree of risk of transmission from health care worker to
patient, even in "invasive, exposure-prone" procedures, is so
low as to be immeasurable, or infinitesimaL

C. The Acer Cluster
Notwithstanding the high level of public concern about
contracting HIV from HIV-infected health care workers, there
has been only one reported instance of a health care worker
transmitting HIV to his patients. In a July 1990 report, the
CDC described its investigation of the case of a young woman
who apparently contracted HIV from her contact with David
Acer, a Florida dentist who had the virus. 39 Seventeen months
after the dentist had extracted two of her teeth, Kimberley
Bergalis, the patient, was diagnosed as having oral candidiasis.40 Two years after the extractions, she was diagnosed as
having pneumonia and subsequent blood tests revealed traces
of the HIV antibody in her blood. 41 She had contracted HIV.

See Kinsley, supra note 33.
Julie L. Gerberding, Expected Costs of Implementing a Mandatory Human
Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus Testing and Restriction Program for
Healthcare Workers Performing Invasive Procedures, 12 INFECTION CONTROL & HOSP.
35.
36.

EPIDEMIOLOGY443, 443 (1991).
37.
ABA, Chicago Hearing, supra note 12, at 121 (statement of Eugene Moats).
38.
MICHIGAN DEP'T OF PuB. HEALTH;, MICHIGAN RECOMMENDATIONS ON HIVINFECTED HEALTH CARE WORKERS 2 (1991) (on file with the University of Michigan

Journal of Law Reform).
39.
See CDC, Possible Transmission of HN, supra note 1, at 489.
40.
Id.
41.
Id.
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Based on its findings that the patient did not have any other
documented behavioral or other risk factors for HIV infection
and that the Florida State Department of Health's investigation demonstrated a striking similarity between the HIV DNA
sequences from the patient and the dentist, the CDC concluded
that Ms. Bergalis possibly had been infected with HIV during
the dental procedure. 42 The CDC conducted a follow-up investigation which identified four additional patients of the dentist
who had become infected with HIV. 43 Finally, on May 7, 1993,
the CDC reported that a sixth patient had become infected
with HIV while receiving care from Dr. Acer. 44 These cases
have come to be known as the Acer cluster.
The CDC stated that its "investigation strongly suggest[ed]
that at least three patients of a dentist with AIDS were infected with HIV during their dental care."45 Although the
precise mode of transmission was unclear, the CDC speculated
that the HIV virus could have been transmitted through needle
stick injuries sustained by the dentist or through use of instruments or other dental equipment previously contaminated with
blood from either the dentist or another patient. 46 The dentist
reportedly had used barrier precautions, but these techniques
were not always consistent or in compliance with the universal
precautions commonly recommended by public health officials. 47
In addition, the CDC found that such precautions often do not
· prevent punctures or cuts that would allow the dentist's blood
to flow directly into an open wound or the mucous membranes
of a patient. 48 The CDC also found that the dentist's office did
not have a written policy for reprocessing dental instruments
and equipment, and that Dr. Acer did not consistently adhere
to universal precautions. 49
Although numerous look-back studies have investigated
whether patients other than Dr. Acer's have contracted HIV
from infected health care workers, no such cases. have been
identified. 50 In the over seventy look-back studies known to the
CDC, 19,036 patients of HIV-infected health care workers were
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS, supra note 27, at 2-3.
See CDC, Transmission of HN Infection-Florida, supra note 1, at 21.
CDC, Inuestigations of Persons Treated, supra note 1, at 329.
CDC, Transmission of HN Infection-Florida, supra note 1, at 26.
Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
Id.
E.g., Phillips et al., supra note 30, at 853 & nn.l, 2 & 43-47.
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tested and none was reported to have been infected by a health
care worker. 51
Recent data collected in three separate studies suggest that
the risk of transmission of HIV from surgeons and dentists to
patients is extremely low. In one study of the patients of an
HIV-infected surgeon, experts found that there was no HIV
transmission in 369 person-hours of surgical exposure, indicating that HIV transmission to patients is unlikely to occur
more frequently than once per thousand person-hours of
surgical exposure. 52 Another study concluded that "the risk of
transmission from an HIV-infected surgeon to patients undergoing invasive procedures is extremely low."53 A third study
of the patients of an HIV-infected dentist found that "[a]mong
900 patients who were actually tested, there were 6,901
dentist-patient contacts without transmission, a rate of less
than 0.0002 per contact."54 Although a small number of HIVinfected patients who did not have other risk factors were
identified in these look-back studies, DNA sequence testing
satisfied the researchers that these patients had not contracted
the virus from an infected health care worker. 55 Finally, the
most recent estimates of the CDC suggest that the risk of a
single patient contracting HIV from an infected surgeon ranges
from one in 42,000 to one in 417,000. 56
Significantly, the only documented cases of apparent transmission from a health care worker to a patient occurred in Dr.
Acer's office, where compliance with infection control procedures was lax. 57 Supporters of mandatory HIV testing for
health care workers speculate that many more patients have
been infected by HIV-infected health care workers but look-

51.
CDC, Investigations of Persons Treated, supra note 1, at 329.
52.
Audrey S. Rogers et al., Investigation of Potential HIV Transmission to the
Patients of an HIV-Infected Surgeon, 269 JAMA 1795, 1799 (1993).
53.
C. Fordham von Reyn et al., Absence of HIV Transmission from an Infected
Orthopedic Surgeon: A 13-Year Look-Back Study, 269 JAMA 1807, 1810 (1993); see
also ABA, Chicago Hearing, supra note 12, at 183-84 (containing testimony of Dr.
Howard J. Hess, who suggested that the risk of HIV transmission in health care
settings "is actually very small").
54.
Gordon M. Dickinson et al., Absence of HIV Transmission from an Infected
Dentist to His Patients, 269 JAMA 1802, 1805 (1993).
55.
Id. at 1804.
56.
Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Open
Meeting on the Risks of Transmission of Blood-borne Pathogens to Patients During
Invasive Procedures (Feb. 21-22, 1991) (transcript at 52, on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
57.
See CDC, Transmission of HIV Infection-Florida, supra note 1, at 21, 25.
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hack studies have not identified these patients. 58 They maintain that the Acer cluster presented the sole opportunity for
DNA sequencing of both a health care worker's and a patient's
strand of HIV, thereby resulting in the only finding that a
health care worker infected his patients. It is not true,
however, that other look-back studies did not perform DNA
sequencing. Most look-back studies performed DNA sequencing
on infected patients for whom other risk factors had been eliminated. 59 To date, no cases of transmission of HIV from health
care worker to patient, other than those in the Acer cluster,
have been documented. 60

D. Universal Precautions and the CDC's Response to the
Acer Cluster to Reduce Risk of Transmission in
the Health Care Setting
On July 12, 1991, partly in response to the publicity surrounding the Acer incident, the CDC published guidelines for
preventing the transmission of Hepatitis B virus (HBV) and
HIV from health care workers to patients. 61 The guidelines may
be summarized as follows:
1.

All health care workers should adhere to "universal precautions"62 in the use and disposal of needles and other
sharp instruments, and comply with current guidelines for
disinfection of reusable devices used in invasive procedures;

58. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
61.
CDC Guidelines, supra note 3. Another important set of guidelines on this
topic are the guidelines of the Occupational Safety and HealthAdministration issued
December 6, 1991. See Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910 (1994). These guidelines have been upheld as a reasonable regulatory response.
See American Dental Ass'n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 172 (1993). This Article will focus on the CDC's guidelines because they are the
most widely known.
62.
"Universal precautions" refer to guidelines issued by the CDC to promote
infection control. CDC Guidelines, supra note 3. The CDC's system treats all human
blood and body fluids as if known to be infectious for HIV, HBV, or other blood-borne
pathogens. Universal precautions involve the appropriate use of protective barriers,
needles, disposal methods, handwashing, education, and record keeping employed in
a routine system such that infections are controlled and transmission risks are minimized or eliminated. See CDC Guidelines, supra note 3, at 2.
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2.

There is no scientific basis to restrict the practice of an·
HIV-infected worker who performs invasive procedures
that are not identified as "exposure-prone," provided universal precautions are practiced, because there is no risk
of infecting patients in non-invasive procedures; 63

3.

HIV-infected workers should not perform "exposure-prone"
procedures unless they have sought authority from a
medical review . panel and have obtained the informed
consent of the patient;

4.

"Exposure-prone" procedures should be more specifically
identified by medical, surgical, dental, and other professional organizations and institutions at which the procedures are performed;

5.

Mandatory testing of health care workers is not recommended because the current assessment of the risk of
transmission does not support the intrusion and costs
attendant to testing;

6.

Compliance with the CDC's recommendations can be increased through education, training, and confidentiality
safeguards. Notification to patients of a possible HIV
exposure and follow-up studies should be done by public
health officials on a case-by-case basis, after taking into
account the specific risks. 64

While only advisory, the CDC Guidelines have subsequently
been adopted into law by many jurisdictions. Congress mandated in 1992 that states adopt the CDC Guidelines or equivalent
protections before October 1992. 65 Some states have adopted
the CDC Guidelines, but other states have certified that they
are developing their own equivalent guidelines. 66 The response
of medical organizations was also divided, with many organizations strongly supporting the CDC's recommendations that all

63. Id. at 5.
64. Id. at 5-6.
65. Treasury, Postal Services and General Government Appropriations Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-141, § 633, 105 Stat. 834, 876-77 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300ee2 (Supp. V 1993)) (requiring states to establish guidelines for the prevention of
transmission of HIV and HBV during invasive procedures).
66. See Phillips et al., supra note 30, at 857.
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health care workers adhere to universal precautions, 6 ? but with
a few organizations opposing them. 68 The National Commission
on AIDS also opposed mandatory testing of health care workers
and urged that any restrictions on the practice of health care
workers should be based on an assessment of the individual
health care worker's professional competence, ability to comply
with universal precautions and any previous transmission of
other blood-borne infections. 69
The CDC supported voluntary HIV tests of health care
workers who perform exposure-prone procedures. Many health
care organizations and experts, including the CDC, have
rejected mandatory testing of health care workers as an
appropriate response to concerns over HIV transmission in the
health care setting. 70 Testing a health care worker provides
information about that worker's HIV status only at a time prior
to the specific time of testing. Thus, test results may be inaccurate because of false positives or negatives. Test results may
also be affected by the "window period" between infection and
the time that the body develops HIV antibodies which would
be reflected on an AIDS test. 71 The reliability of a negative test

67. See generally ABA, Washington Hearing, supra note 12 (containing testimony
of representatives of the American Association of Dental Schools, American Medical
Association, and the Federation of State and Medical Boards); ABA, Chicago Hearing,
supra note 12 (containing testimony of representatives of the American College of
Emergency Physicians and the Federation of State Medical Boards). At least one group
that opposed the CDC Guidelines did so because the guidelines were too restrictive
of health care workers. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON AIDS, PREVENTING HIV TRANSMISSION IN HEALTH CARE SETTINGS 9 (1992) (stating that the Infectious Disease Society
of America opposed any restriction on practice by HIV-infected health care workers).
68. See, e.g.• AMERICAN CoLLEGE OF SURGEONS, STATEMENT ON THE SURGEON AND
HIV INFECTION 28, 30-31 (1991). Although this statement agrees with the CDC that
health care workers should comply with "universal precautions,n the statement's
recommendations vary drastically in content from the CDC's. See id. For one perspective from abroad, see Lynn M. Peterson, Book Review, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 450-51
(1993) (reviewing THE IMPACT OF HIV ON SURGICAL PRACTICE (J.P.S. Cochrane & C.
Wastell eds., 1992) and noting that England's Royal College of Surgeons believes that
HIV-infe.cted surgeons should never perform invasive procedures):
69.
NATIONAL COMM'N ON AIDS, supra note 67, at 22-23, 29. The National
Commission on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome was established by Pub. L.
No. 100-607, §§ 241-249, 102 Stat. 3048, 3104-08 (1988), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 300cc app. (1988).
70. ABA, Chicago Hearing, supra note 12, at 62.
71.
This Article uses the term "window periodn to describe the period from six
weeks to three months from the time of infection until the appearance of HIV antibodies. See JOSEPH T. PAINTER, AMERICAN MEDICAL AsS'N, REPORT OF THE BOARD OF
TRUSTEES: HIV AND PHYSICIANS 6 (1991), reprinted in ABA, Chicago Briefing Book,
supra note 12, pt. 5. During this "window period," an infected person would not
produce HIV antibodies and an HIV test would be negative although the virus would
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result also could be affected by subsequent opportunities for
exposure. Finally, negative test results could lead to the
unjustified relaxation of and decreased dependence on universal precautions.

E. Conclusions
In light of the infinitesimal risk72 that a health care worker
will transmit HIV to a patient, the AIDS Coordinating Committee (the Committee) recommends that states adopt legislation which allows health care workers infected with HIV or
HBV to continue their jobs unless unusual circumstances
surrounding their medical practices or procedures demonstrably pose a significant risk to patients. For infected health
care workers who perform exposure-prone procedures, an
expert review panel should advise the worker on the circumstances under which they may continue to perform these
invasive procedures. Based on our hearings and based on the
reaction of medical groups to the CDC's guidelines, the Committee believes that voluntary HIV testing and voluntary use
of expert review panels are most effective, particularly because
a voluntary system more likely will encourage health care
workers to have an HIV test and learn about their HIV status.
Armed with that knowledge, the health care provider can take
appropriate precautions to minimize even the tiny risk of HIV
transmission in the health care setting.
II. HIV-INFECTED HEALTH CARE WORKERS AND
EMPLOYMENT
Courts that have considered the issue have reached different
results as to whether a hospital or other health care employer

be present. Id. Periodic retesting provides greater assurance that a negative HIV test
result is correct. See Larry Gostin, The HIV Infected Health Care Professional: Public
Policy, Discrimination and Patient Safety, 18 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 303, 307
(1990); Helena Brett-Smith & Gerald H. Friedland, Transmission and Treatment, in
AIDS LAW TODAY: A NEW GUIDE FOR THE PuBLIC 18, 32 (Scott Burris et al. eds.,
1993).
72. See supra Part l.B-C.
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may terminate a health care worker's employment on account
of that worker's HIV status. 73 Not surprisingly, a court's opinion about the likelihood that an infected health care worker
would transmit HIV to a patient significantly influences the
court's decision on the merits of the health care worker's
employment dispute. Such variation is troubling because the
facts about the low risk of HIV transmission from health care
worker to patient do not change significantly from case to case.
Rather, what varies is the court's own measure of how "significant" the risk of HIV transmission is. The significance of the
risk of transmitting a disease is an important factor in determining an employee's protection from adverse employment
decisions under current Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly,
the legal system should incorporate more uniformly medical
knowledge about the risks of HIV transmission from health
care workers to patients and should protect the employment
rights of health care professionals. 74
A. Statutory Protections of
HIV-Infected Employees

Two federal statutes protect HIV-infected employees, including health care workers, from employment discrimination.
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 75 prohibits entities that receive
federal financial assistance, entities that have federal contracts, and the federal government itself, from discriminating
against an "otherwise qualified individual with a disability ...
solely by reason of her or his disability."76 Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)77 prohibits discrimination by
private employers against a "qualified individual with a

73.
Compare Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp., 887 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(upholding the hospital's decision to bar Dr. Scoles from performing surgery at any
ofits hospitals without proof that his patients knew of his HIV status, in part because
the doctor had not established that he did not pose a "significant risk" to his patients)
with Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559 (D.D.C. 1992) (striking down as
discriminatory the defendant's decision to withdraw an offer of employment as a fire
fighter to an HIV positive individual, in spite of a medical determination that having
HIV rendered plaintiff unfit for such work).
74. See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1987).
75.
29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
76. Id. § 794(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
77.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (Supp. V 1993).
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disability'' who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the desired employment
position. 78 Title II of the ADA prohibits state and local governments from discriminating against qualified individuals with
disabilities. 79 Title III of the ADA prohibits private businesses,
including hospitals, from discriminating against individuals
with disabilities in the provision of goods or services, including
the provision of privileges. 80
Although the two statutes contain different terms, the elements necessary to establish a prima facie claim under each
law are essentially identical. An HIV-infected individual
alleging discriminatory treatment must demonstrate that she:
(1) has a "handicap" or a "disability" within the applicable
statute; 81 (2) was otherwise qualified for the position; 82 and (3)
was discriminated against on the basis of the handicap or
disability. 83 In 1992, Congress added a provision to section 501
of the Rehabilitation Act providing that the standards of the
ADA would apply to all section 501 claims. 84
1. Definitions of Disability Under the ADA-HIV infection
is a covered disability under the ADA. To receive protection
·from the federal statutes, a health care worker must have a
"disability," as defined by the relevant statutes. The worker
must fit into one of three general definitions: (1) have a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more·

78.
Id. §§ 12111(8), 12112. The ADA covers private employers with 15 or more
employees. Id. § 12111{5){A).
79.
Id. § 12131.
80. Id. § 12182.
81.
29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. V 1993). Because the
definitions of "handicap" and "disability" are almost identical, this Part will use the
term "disability" exclusively, even when referring to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
82.
29 u.s.c. § 794 (1988); 42 u.s.c. § 12111(8).
83.
29 U.S.C. § 794; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). See generally Robert B. Fitzpatrick &
E. Anne Benaroya, Applying the Americans with Disabilities Act to AIDS, ALl-ABA
COURSE MATERIALS J., Apr. 1992, at 79 {suggesting steps for employers to take in
order to avoid AIDS-related conflicts in the workplace); Chai R. Feldblum, Workplace
Issues: HIV and Discrimination, in AIDS AGENDA: EMERGING ISSUES IN CIVIL RIGHTS
271 (Nan D. Hunter & William B. Rubenstein eds., 1992) (arguing that the ADA will
extend protection against workplace discrimination to persons with HIV).
84.
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, sec. 503(b),
§ 501, 106 Stat. 4344, 4424 {codified at 29 U.S.C. § 791(g) (Supp. V 1993)). The 1992
Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act state: "The standards used to determine
whether this section has been violated in a complaint alleging nonaffirmative action
employment discrimination under this section shall be the standards applied under
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 .... " 29 U.S.C. § 791(g) (Supp.
v 1993).
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major life activities; (2) be regarded as having such an impairment; or (3) have a record of such an impairment. 85
With respect to physical impairment that substantially limits
a major life activity, regulations promulgated by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and other
government agencies define a physical impairment as "[a]ny
physiological disorder, or condition ... affecting one or more
of the ... body systems ... hemic and lymphatic." 86 Major life
activities are defined in EEOC 87 and Department of Justice
(DOJ)88 regulations in a nonexhaustive list as including functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working. The DOJ concluded that HIV infection substantially
limits an infected individual's major life activities such as
normal procreation, freedom from the fear of how the infection
will effect a fetus, and forming intimate personal relationships. 89 The DOJ Guidance to the ADA regulations repeats this
conclusion regarding HIV infection. 90 The EEOC also has
concluded that HIV infection substantially limits a major life
activity and thus falls within the first prong pf the definition
of a disability. 91
In claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act, courts have
agreed with the premise that individuals with AIDS and
asymptomatic HIV infection are individuals with a handicap. 92

85.
29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (Supp. V 1993); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. V 1993).
These three statutory definitions are alternative definitions. Thus, an individual need
satisfy only one of the three alternatives to meet the statutory definition. See 29
U.S.C. § 706(8)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
86. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1995) (Health and Human Services Regulations); 45
C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(A) (1994) (EEOC regulations).
87. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1994).
88.
28 C.F.R. § 36.104(2) (1994).
89. Justice Department Memorandum on the Application of Section 504 of the 1973
Rehabilitation Act to HIV-Infected Persons, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (Fair Empl. Prac.)
No. 641, at 405:4, 405:6-:7 (Sept. 27, 1988).
90. See Department of Justice Guidance, 28 C.F.R. app. § 36.104 (1995). The
Department of Justice inserted the phrase "symptomatic or asymptomaticn before the
term "HIV diseasen in order to clarify that both symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV
infection are covered. See id.
91. See EEOC Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1995) ("Other impairments ... such as HIV infection, are
inherently substantially limiting. n).
92. See, e.g., Severino v. North Fort Myers Fire Control Dist., 935 F.2d 1179 (11th
Cir. 1991); Martinez v. School Bd., 861 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 1988); Chalk v. United
States Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988); Glanz v. Vernick, 756 F. Supp. 632 (D.
Mass. 1991); Doe v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 723 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Cal.
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Individuals with AIDS and asymptomatic HIV infection have
also been permitted to state claims as individuals with disabilities under the ADA. 93
The third category of disability under the statutes-having
a record of an impairment-protects individuals who have been
misclassified as HIV-positive in, for example, educational,
medical, or employment files. 94 It very much resembles the
second category-being regarded as having an impairment-in
that it protects a person from discriminatory animus even if
the discriminator makes a factual error about whether the
person is HIV positive. 95 Also, individuals who do not have
AIDS and are not HIV-infected are protected even if they
merely fit an employer's stereotype of the type of health care
worker who might be HIV-infected. For example, a gay man
who is falsely believed to be HIV-infected is nonetheless
covered by the ADA if discriminated against in employment
because he is perceived to be HIV-infected. 96
2. The Direct Threat and Significant Risk Test-When
Congress passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 ,97 it
added a provision to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
stating that persons with "contagious diseases or infections"
are not covered under section 504 if they pose a "direct threat
to the health or. safety of other individuals."98 The members of
Congress who introduced this provision explained that it was
designed to codify the standard set in School Board v. Arline. 99

1989), affd in part and vacated in part, 941 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1991); Thomas v.
Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
93.
See Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, P.C., 866 F. Supp. 190 (E.D. Pa. 1994); United
States v. Morvant, 843 F. Supp. 1092 (E.D. La. 1994).
94. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (1995). Such individuals could also argue that they
fall under the second prong of the definition of disability-protecting those "regarded
as" having an impairment.
95.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(3) (1995).
96.
State laws often have analogous definitions of "disability," which have been
used to protect people perceived to be HIV-infected. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Lagoudakis,
486 N.W.2d 657 (Mich. 1992) (holding that a plaintiff without HIV could still bring
suit under the Michigan Handicap Civil Rights Act where her employer's discrimination was motivated by the erroneous perception that plaintiff was HIV-positive).
97.
Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
98.
§ 9, 102 Stat. at 31-32 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(D) (Supp. V
1993)).
99.
480 U.S. 273 (1987); see, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. S1739 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988)
(colloquy statement of Sen. Harkin) ("'A person who poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious disease to others in the workplace will not be otherwise
qualified for his or her job if reasonable accommodation will not eliminate that risk.'"
(quoting School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.16 (1987)).
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Arline held that, for individuals who pose a significant health
risk to others in the workplace and who have contagious
diseases, these individuals are not otherwise qualified for the
jobs they seek to hold "if reasonable accommodation will not
eliminate that risk." 100 Several members of Congress also
explained that the specific reference to contagious infections
in the new provision was to reaffirm coverage of people with
asymptomatic HIV infection under section 504, unless they
posed a direct threat to others. 101
In Arline, the Supreme Court ruled that four factors must be
analyzed to determine whether a person with a contagious
disease posed a "significant risk" to others:
(a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted),
(b) the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is the potential
harm to third parties) and (d) the probabilities the disease
will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of
harm. 102
The risk assessment must also include findings on whether the
employer could reasonably accommodate an individual who is
infected with a contagious illness. 103 The Sup~eme Court noted
that "courts normally should defer to the reasonable medical
judgments of public health officials" 104 when determining
whether an individual infected with a contagious illness poses
a "significant risk" to others in the workplace. 105

100. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.16.
101. See 134 CONG. REC. H574 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Rep. Owens);
134 CONG. REC. H573 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Rep. Weiss); 134 CONG.
REC. E487 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Rep. Hoyer).
102. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288.
103. Id. Statements by sponsors during the floor debate of the Civil Rights Restoration Act indicate a legislative intent to codify the approach to risk assessment
outlined in Arline. See 134 CONG. REC. H575 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of
Rep. Waxman) (noting that "some Members want the holding [of Arline] codified in
statute, and I will not oppose doing so"). But see 134 CONG. REC. H580 (daily ed. Mar.
2, 1988) (statement of Rep. Dannemeyer) (urging that the House should reject the bill
because members had not had an opportunity to debate the implications of codifying
the Arline decision).
104. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288.
105. See id. at 287 n.16. The Supreme Court also noted that "[t)his case does not
present, and we do not address, the question whether courts should also defer to the
reasonable medical judgments of private physicians on which an employer has relied."
Id. at 288 n.18.
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Unlike the Rehabilitation Act, which does not provide a
statutory definition of "direct threat," 106 the ADA explicitly
defines a "direct threat" to mean "a significant risk to the
health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation. "107 The legislative history to this
section indicates congressional intent to adopt the Arline
approach and to establish a strict showing of actual risk. As
the House Education and Labor Committee Report explained:
[F]or a person with a currently contagious disease or infection to constitute a direct threat to the health or safety or
[sic] others, the person must pose a significant risk of
transmitting the infection to others in the workplace which
cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation. 108
The EEOC, following the legislative history, likewise explained
that the significant risk test is intended to be substantial. The
EEOC's ADA regulations require that the disability pose a
significant risk of substantial harm. 109

B. Judicial Decisions Restricting Employment
of HIV-Infected Health Care Workers
Courts and agencies deciding cases concerning continued
employment of HIV-infected health care providers have assessed the significance of the risk that these workers pose to
their patients in varying ways. This variation is, of itself,
troubling because the scientific facts concerning the risk of
transmission posed by an HIV-infected health care worker
using proper infection control procedures do not change. As the
following cases demonstrate, stereotype, misunderstanding,
and fear dominate the decisions in which courts have restricted
the employment of HIV-positive health care workers while
adherence to the medical and scientific facts more often prevails in the decisions permitting HIV-positive health care
workers to maintain their employment responsibilities.
106. 29 u.s.c. § 706 (1988).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (Supp. V 1993).
108. H.R. REP. No. 485, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 76 (1990) (emphasis added),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 358-59.
109. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1995).
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This Article will address decisions concerning employment,
credentialling, and students, with the relevant cases on each
topic discussed in chronological order.
1. Employees-The first court case to address the issue of
an HIV-infected health care worker upheld a hospital's decision
to fire a health care worker who failed to report his HIV test
results to the hospital. In Lechelt v. Board of Commissioners
ofHospital District No. 1, 110 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that the nurse failed to prove he had
been fired solely because of a perceived handicap. m Rather, the
court concluded, the nurse had been fired because he had failed
to submit HIV test results in compliance with hospital policy. 112
The court also concluded that the hospital was justified, based
on the CDC guidelines in effect at the time, in requiring testing
of all health care workers who might pose any risk of exposure
to patients. 113
More recently, the Fifth Circuit held that a hospital did not
violate the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 when it reassigned a
surgical assistant who was HIV-positive to a purchasing
department position with no patient contact. In Bradley v.
University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, 114 the court
defined the issue as whether the plaintiff was "otherwise
qualified" to continue in his employment as a surgical technician despite his HIV status. 115 The court stated that plaintiff
Bradley's position as a surgical assistant required him to
handle sharp instruments and to come in direct contact with
open wounds, and the court noted that Bradley had suffered
five needle puncture wounds while on the job. 116 The court
concluded that while the CDC had characterized the risk of
transmitting HIV from an infected health care worker to. a

110. 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990).
111. Id. at 826.
112. Id.; cf Doe by Lavery v. United States Attorney Gen., 814 F. Supp. 844, 848
. (N.D .. Cal. 1992) (holding that the FBI did not violate. the Rehabilitation Act by
discontinuing its contract with a physician with AIDS because the physician would
not provide information about transmission risks and prevention), rev'd, 62 F.3d 1424
(9th Cir. 1995).
113. Leckelt, 909 F.2d at 830. The most recent CDC guidelines, of course, do not
call for mandatory testing of all health care workers. In addition, under the ADA, the
statutory language that an individual must prove he or she was discriminated against
"solely" on the basis of disability was deleted. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (Supp. V 1993);
H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 108, at 85, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 367-68.
114. 3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1071 (1994).
115. Id. at 924.
116. Id.
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patient as small, the risk was "not so low as to nullify the
catastrophic consequences of an accident." 117
In December 1994, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled that a hospital's refusal
to allow an HIV-positive surgeon to perform surgery did not
violate either the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA. In Scoles u.
Mercy Health Corp., 118 defendant Mercy Health refused to allow
the plaintiff, Dr. Scoles, to perform invasive procedures at any
ofits hospitals without documentation stating that his patients
were aware of his HIV status. 119 In addition, each patient had
to consent to having Dr. Scoles perform their procedure. 120 In
denying both the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, the court
found that the plaintiff had failed to establish that he was not
a "direct threat" or a "significant risk" to his patients. 121 In so
finding, the court dismissed plaintiff's argument that the risk
of transmission of HIV was low, and instead held that "knowledge of the probability of HIV transmission from surgeon to
patient is very limited." 122 The court was heavily influenced by
the fact that "the disease ... is almost always fatal." 123 Clearly,
fear of HIV dominated the court's view of the case.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit recently held that a neurosurgical
resident could be fired because _he was HIV-positive, effectively
dismissing the resident's claims under the Rehabilitation Act
and the ADA. Doe u. University of Maryland Medical System
Corp. 124 involved a neurosurgical resident whose HIV status
was discovered in the third year of a six-year residency training. After Dr. Doe refused to transfer to a non-surgical residency, the University of Maryland Medical System Corporation
(UMMSC) terminated him from its residency program. 125 In
upholding his termination, the Fourth Circuit rejected Dr.
Doe's argument that the risk of his transmitting HIV to one of
his patients was "so infinitesimal that it cannot, regardless of
the degree of harm involved, be considered a significant
risk." 126 While the court occasionally stated that it based its

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
887 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
Id. at 767.
Id.
Id. at 772.
Id.
Id.
50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1262-63.
Id. at 1266.

SUMMER 1995]

HIV in the Health Care Setting

757

holding on a risk of transmission from "exposure-prone procedures,"127 further analysis of the case makes it clear that the
court concluded that Dr. Doe posed a significant health and
safety risk because the "risk of percutaneous injury can never
be eliminated." 128 The court never identified a single case of
surgeon to patient transmission, however, even in exposureprone procedures. 129 The Fourth Circuit even went so far as to
state that "extra precautions," over and above the universal
precautions already required by the hospital's medical review
board, were inadequate because "some measure of risk will
always exist." 13° Clearly, the court was not evaluating significant risk as required by School Board v. Arline, 131 but rather
allowed the hospital to terminate Dr. Doe unless he presented
an absolute guarantee against the possibility that he would
transmit HIV.
The University Medical System case is particularly disturbing
because the hospital rejected a recommendation of its own
panel of experts on blood-borne pathogens that Dr. Doe could
safely continue a neurosurgical practice as long as he strictly
followed proper infection-control procedures. 132 The panel
suggested minimal restrictions on Dr. Doe's ability to perform
surgical procedures and did not recommend that he notify his
patients of his HIV status prior to· performing surgery on
them. 133 Such is precisely the type of informed medical judgment which the CDC Guidelines recommend that an employer
obtain. 134 The fact that the hospital rejected the expert medical
panel's judgment is disturbing, perhaps dwarfed only by the
fact that the court upheld the hospital's opinion. In effect, the
court placed its own judgment ahead of that of medical professionals135-in contravention of the Supreme Court's admonition

127. Id. at 1267.
128. Id. at 1266 (citing Bradley v. University M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d
922 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1071 (1994)).
129. Id. ("Although there may presently be no documented case of surgeon-topatient transmission, such transmission clearly is possible.").
130. Id.
131. See supra Part 11.A.2.
132. Id. at 1262.
133. Id.
134. CDC Guidelines, supra note 3, at 142.
135. The Fourth Circuit noted that it deferred to the medical judgment of the
hospital as a whole, not to that of the medical review panel. When the hospital
rejected the medical review panel's findings, the court then disregarded those findings
as well. University Medical Sys., 50 F.3d at 1266.
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in Arline to defer to reasonable medical judgment. 136 In fact,
the court seems to conclude that, as long as the hospital
demonstrated no intent to hurt Dr. Doe, the hospital's actions
are justified regardless of whether Dr. Doe has a .protected
disability. 137
The courts in Lechelt, Bradley, Scoles, and University Medical
System relied heavily on the presumption that, although the
risk of transmission of HIV from a health care worker to a
patient is quite low, an infected health care worker could still
be considered "not qualified" because the potential outcome of
the risk, if it occurred, would be catastrophic. This analysis,
however, contradicts the legislative history of the ADA and the
EEOC Interpretive Guidance to the ADA which specifically
require that an employer prove that an individual's disability
will pose a "significant risk of substantial harm." 138 Under the
ADA approach, therefore, it would not suffice for one part of
the equation, such as the substantial nature of the harm, to be
high. Rather, there must be some showing to demonstrate that
the first part of the equation, the significance of the risk, is
also high. 139
In addition, these courts have improperly placed the burden
of demonstrating an absence of risk on the infected health care
worker. In Scoles, for example, the court found that Dr. Scoles
had failed to establish that he did not pose a significant risk
to his patients. 140 Under the ADA, the presumption should be
reversed and rest in favor of the health care worker, because
a worker will not transmit HIV in most cases. The ADA
provides that a person should be protected from adverse
employment decisions, unless the employer can demonstrate
that the worker presents a significant risk of substantial
harm. 141

136. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987). We believe that the Fourth
Circuit's conclusion is erroneous because the CDC and Arline recommend deference to
medical expertise-not to the business-based decisions of administrators and lawyers
who may be motivated by fear, among other factors, of lawsuits by patients. Id.
137. University Medical Sys., 50 F.3d at 1266 ("[T]here is nothing in the record
to indicate that UMMSC acted with anything other than the best interests of its
patients and Dr. Doe at heart."). Of course, discriminatory animus is not an element
of an ADA or Rehabilitation Act case. Id. at 1264-65.
138. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 108, at 76, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 358-59. EEOC Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans With Disabilities
Act, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r) (1995) (emphasis added).
139. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r).
140. Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp., 887 F. Supp. 765, 772 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (Supp. V 1993); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r).
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Other cases under the Rehabilitation Act have resulted in
findings in favor of the HIV-infected person. In these cases, the
courts have focused on the low probability of HIV transmission
to a patient. For example, in 1992, the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) ordered the termination of federal
financial assistance to the Westchester County Medical Center
because of the center's continuing discrimination against a
pharmacist infected with HIV. 142 The HHS Appeals Board held
that the risk of the pharmacist transmitting HIV through the
preparation of the pharmaceutical product at issue was "so
small as not to be measurable." 143 The agency relied on those
studies which found that non-invasive procedures, such as the
preparation of pharmaceutical products, pose no risk for the
transmission of HIV. 144 The agency carefully examined the
pharmacist's job to determine whether he performed any
"exposure-prone invasive procedures" as identified by the CDC
and found that the tasks performed by the pharmacist fell
outside those exposure-prone procedures. 145
The same type of analysis was used by the court in John Doe
v. District of Columbia. 146 The District of Columbia's Fire
Department withdrew an offer of employment to the plaintiff
because of a medical determination that his HIV-positive
status rendered him unfit to work as a fire fighter. 147 The
district court found the fir.e department's conduct discriminatory and ordered the reinstatement of Doe in a fire fighting
position, back pay with interest, compensatory damages of
$25,000, and attorney fees and court costs. 148
To reach its decision, the court scrutinized the protective
gear and equipment used on the job by fire fighters. 149 Based
on expert testimony that the risk of blood-to-blood transmission
by a fire fighter on the job was "remote," the court conclµded
there was "no measurable risk" that Doe would transmit the

142. See, e.g., In re Westchester County Medical Ctr., [1991-1994 Transfer Binder]
Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 'I 5340, at 6108 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. Apr. 20,
1992).
143. Id. at 6119.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 796 F. Supp. 559, 568-69 (D.D.C. 1992).
147. Id. at 566.
148. Id. at 573-74.
149. The court noted that a fire fighter's helmet, hood, "bunker coat," "bunker
pants," gloves, "bunker boots," self-contained breathing apparatus and emergency
medical kit provided a barrier for the transmission of HIV. Id. at 561-62.
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virus to other fire fighters or the public during the performance
of fire fighting duties. 150 The court gave great deference to the
medical judgments of public health officials on the identifiable
risk of transmitting the HIV virus while employed in the health
care industry. For example, the court relied on CDC statistics
which estimate that the risk of a health care worker communicating the HIV virus on the job ranged between 0.3% and 0.5%.
The court stated that it was "join[ing] other courts that have
refused to regard the theoretical or remote possibility of transmission of HIV as a basis of excluding HIV-infected persons
from employment or educational opportunities." 151 The same
court also held in a subsequent case that a fire fighter infected
with Hepatitis B virus (HBV) would not be a "direct threat"
when performing mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. 152 For this
reason, the employer's conduct in restricting the fire fighter
~iolated the Rehabilitation Act. 153
Under the Rehabilitation Act, most courts have appropriately
recognized that the severity of the consequences of transmitting
HIV is, as a matter oflaw, insufficient to find an HIV-infected
individual unqualified for a job if the risk of transmission
through occupational contact is incredibly small. Courts that
overemphasize the consequences of transmission of HIV dero.:
gate from their statutory duty. As noted in the legislative
history of the ADA154 and the EEOC's regulations, 155 Congress
and the Executive did not expect that "any'' risk of a catastrophic outcome sufficed to justify employment discrimination.
Accordingly, they provided a test for significant risk. A risk
which is considered extremely unlikely to occur should not be
termed a "significant risk," even if the consequences are catastrophic.
2. Credentialling-Hospitals' credentialling decisions are
also subject to antidiscrimination statutes. Two types of credentials are often essential to a physician's ability to practice
medicine: (1) medical staff membership and associated clinical
privileges at one or more hospitals, and (2) membership on one

150. Id. at 564.
151. Id. at 569.
152. Roe v. District of Columbia, 842 F. Supp. 563, 590 (D.D.C. 1993), uacated, 25
F.3d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
153. Id.
154. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 108, at 76, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 358-59.
155. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r) (1995) (defining "direct threat").
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or more managed care panels, such as the provider directory of
a health maintenance organization (HMO).
Coverage of credentialling decisions exists in a variety of
provisions within the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, for example, has been interpreted
by courts to apply to all actions taken by a hospital that receives
Medicare or Medicaid funding. 156 In addition, Title III of the
ADA explicitly prohibits hospitals from discriminating on the
basis of disability in granting hospital privileges. 157 Title I of the
ADA applies to medical staff members who call themselves
independent contractors if such personnel are considered "employees" under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 158
In Estate ofBehringer v. Medical Center at Princeton, 159 a case
brought under New Jersey's disability antidiscrimination law,
the court upheld a hospital policy prohibiting HIV-infected
health care providers from performing "any activity," including
surgical procedures, "'that creates a risk of transmission of the
disease to others."' 160 The hospital restricted Dr. Behringer's
surgical privileges after it learned that he was diagnosed with
AIDS. 161 The court upheld the restrictions based on its findings
that patients faced two possible risks if Dr. Behringer operated on them-the risk of becoming infected with HIV and the
risk of simple exposure to Dr. Behringer's blood, which may
then subject a patient to "months or even years of continued
HIV testing." 162 The court's analysis did not consider whether
the minimal possibility of actual transmission of HIV to a patient sufficed to cause Dr. Behringer's HIV status to rise to the
level of "significant risk" required by the ADA. 163
156. See Frazier v. Board of Trustees of Northwest Miss. Regional Medical Ctr., 765
F.2d 1278, 1289 (5th Cir.), amended, 777 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1142 (1986); United States v. Baylor Univ. Medical Ctr., 736 F.2d 1039, 1040-41 (5th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985); NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Ctr., Inc.,
599 F.2d 1247, 1248 n.4 (3d Cir. 1979), affd, 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir.) (1981).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
158. See Mitchell v. Frank R. Howard Memorial Hosp., 853 F.2d 762, 76~7 (9th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1013 (1989); Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp.,
765 F. Supp. 461, 468-69 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Mousavi v. Beebe Hosp., 674 F. Supp. 145,
149-50 (D. Del. 1987), affd, 853 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1988).
159. 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
160. Id. at 1275 (quoting the hospital's policy). The court decided that "the
physician must make reasonable disclosure of the information and those risks which
a reasonably prudent patient would consider material." Id. at 1278.
161. Id. at 1257-60.
162. Id. at 1279.
163. But see Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp., 887 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(denying surgical privileges to HIV-positive surgeon because of fatal nature of
AIDS, despite uncertainty about degree of risk to patients).
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In addition to the antidiscrimination legislation, tort liability
exists for the hospital or managed care plan that negligently
credentials a physician who is truly hazardous to a patient. 164
It is unclear whether the risk of tort liability should allow a
hospital or managed care panel to require a physician to present evidence of HIV negativity. In contrast to most private
sector employment decisions, credentialling decisions generally
are made under an explicit set of procedures and criteria,
which the credentialling body by contract must follow.
Credentialling procedures are designed to ensure that the
practitioner furnishes high quality care and has good clinical
judgment and technical skills. 165 According to these standards,
the credentialling institution, the hospital in Behringer, is
entitled to information about a practitioner's health status
before granting or renewing credentials. 166 This requirement is
consistent with hospital infection control procedures that
generally require affirmative disclosure of diseases that may
be communicable. 167
In the context of HIV and AIDS, such disclosure requirements do not seem to bear any rational relationship to the
harm which a hospital attempts to avoid. A medical staff seeks
to avoid the risk of transmission of HIV-mere status as an
HIV-positive practitioner does not necessarily do any damage.
A better credentialling standard would focus on the individual's competence, and in particular on the individual's ability to
satisfy the technical infection control procedures of the institution or medical plan. As noted above, adherence to infection
control procedures is most relevant to the risk of transmission.
Exclusion of a practitioner merely based on HIV-status is
overprotective because many experts believe that an HIVpositive doctor who adheres to universal precautions and does
not perform invasive procedures poses an infinitesimal risk of
HIV transmission to their patients. It is also dangerous to
ignore the quality of infection control procedures because a

164. For a related discussion of tort liability in risk determination and mandatory testing of health care workers, see Mark D. Johnson, HIV Testing of Health Care
Workers: Conflict Between the Common Law and the Centers for Disease Control, 42
AM. U. L. REV. 479 (1993).
165. See, e.g.' JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS,
AMH: ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 54 (1993) ("The criteria are designed
to assure the medical staff and governing body that patients will receive quality
care.").
166. Id.
167. Id. at 37-38.
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health care worker who is infected with HIV, but who has not
yet seroconverted, 168 could receive credentials and still pose a
risk of infection if he fails to adhere to uniform precautions.
The ABA AIDS Coordinating Committee believes that a health
care worker should be denied credentials based on HIV-positive status only if the person fails to adhere to appropriate
infection controls and universal precautions.
3. Students-In at least one instance, a court limited an
HIV-infected student's entry into work in a health care setting. In Doe v. Washington University, 169 the court upheld the
university's decision to expel a third-year dental student who
was HIV-positive. 170 The court found the decision to be "academic" and not "medical" and thus used a less restrictive
standard of review to determine if the university's expulsion of
the student was discriminatory. 171 In reviewing the "academic"
decision to disenroll the plaintiff, the court stated it would not
overturn the university's decision unless it constituted "such 'a
substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to
demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not
actually exercise professional judgment.' "172
The court deferred to the university's decision, in large part
because that decision was made after conferring with more
than forty professionals, considering medical information, and
balancing the individual rights at stake. 173 The court observed:
"To permit even an occasional death to occur because of a
failure to scrupulously guard the safety of patients would
appear to be morally unacceptable and contrary to the fiduciary responsibilities of the medical profession.'' 174 Although the
court declined to address the broader question of whether
HIV-positive health care workers should perform invasive
pfocedures, it reached the narrower question of whether the
university properly made this "academic" decision. 175 Within
this narrower issue, the court upheld the university's conclusion that the student posed a significant risk to patients whom

168. For a definition of "seroconversion," see supra note 24. See also supra note
71 and accompanying text (describing the "window period" between infection and

appearance of HIV antibodies).
169. 780 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
170. Id. at 630.
171. Id. at 631.
172. Id. (citation omitted).
173. Id. at 634.
174. Id. at 633-34.
175. Id. at 634.
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he treated while completing the university's requirement of
1021 clinical procedure hours. 176
The analysis of the Washington University court is flawed
because it focuses on the severity of harm caused by AIDS,
rather than on the insignificant risk of transmission in a medical setting. HIV-positive dentists can safely practice dentistry
if they follow proper infection control practices. All dental
students should adhere to those same infection control standards because many dental students who are not known to
carry a blood disease may nonetheless carry HIV or HBV.
Moreover, it appears highly questionable whether the university and the court applied the proper standard of review
because the decision to expel the student based on his HIVpositive status could be considered as much medical as
academic.
Educational decisions do, however, present distinct issues
from most employment contexts because issues of academic
standards are present. It may, for example, have been appropriate for the university to refuse enrollment on the grounds.
that a student cannot adhere to proper infection control procedures in the early periods of her patient care because of her
lack of experience. However, no scientific justification exists
for automatically barring HIV-infected students from professional schools. Such exclusions violate the antidiscrimination
provisions of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, as discussed
above.

C. Mandatory HIV-Testing of Health Care Workers
No restriction has caused more concern or response within
the health care industry than that of mandatory testing of
health care workers to determine their HIV status. Courts
have upheld mandatory HIV testing for fire fighters, paramedics, and personnel working overseas for the United States
Department of State. 177 In Anonymous Fireman v. City of

176. Id. at 633-34.
177. E.g., Anonymous Fireman v. City of Willoughby, 779 F. Supp. 402 (N.D.
Ohio 1991) (upholding a city's mandatory HIV blood testing policy for fire fighters
and parmedics because they are "high-risk government employees"); Local 1812,
American Fed'n ofGov't Employees v. United States Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp. 50,
53-54 CD.D.C. 1987) (holding that the likelihood that the plaintiff union would
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Willoughby, 178 for example, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio applied a strict scrutiny standard of review and found that protecting the public from the
contraction and transmission of AIDS constituted a compelling
governmental interest which justified the intrusion into workers' privacy caused by mandatory testing. 179
In Anonymous Fireman, the court upheld a city's policy of
requiring mandatory HIV testing of fire fighters and paramedics
as part of their annual physical examination to determine each
worker's "fitness to serve." 180 The court found mandatory testing
reasonable based on the compelling governmental interests in:
(1) maintaining a safe work force, (2) protecting "the public from
the contraction and transmission of AIDS by fire fighters and
paramedics," and (3) "[s]topping the spread of the deadly AIDS
epidemic."181 Mandatory testing "for the sole purpose of obtaining a baseline to determine whether an employee contracted
AIDS on the job and thereby determine the validity of any
future worker's compensation claims" was found not to constitute a valid governmental interest. 182 The court also held that
"[m]andatory AIDS testing of employees can be valid only if the
group of employees involved is at a high risk of contracting
and/or transmitting AIDS to the public." 183 Accordingly, the court
found that the risk of HIV transmission in the performance of
duties as a fire fighter or paramedic was "high," 184 and upheld
the mandatory testing requirement. 185

prevail was insufficient to justify a preliminary injunction where plaintiff represented foreign service employees who sought to bar mandatory HIV testing as part
of medical fitness program).
178. 779 F. Supp. 402 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
179. Id. at 402.
180. Id. at 404.
181. Id. at 416.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 417.
185. The Anonymous Fireman court's risk assessment gave great weight to its
finding that "universal precautions for fire fighters ... are not very practical because
it is difficult to function wearing all of these garments; it is too much paraphernalia
[sic] to work efficiently." Id. at 407. Fire fighters and paramedics are, thus, in a higher
risk occupation than hospital workers because they work in a noncontrolled environment that renders universal precautions less practical. The court also noted that the
dangerous "line of work" performed by fire fighters created an increased risk of
transmission of HIV and of being exposed to blood, bodily secretions, and bodily fluids
of rescue victims. Id. at 412. The public's interest in preventing, detecting, and
treating HIV as soon as possible rendered the testing requirement reasonable in the
eyes of the court. Id. at 418.
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In Glover v. Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retardation,186 however, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit struck down a policy requiring employees to be
tested for HBV and HIV because the policy had "'little, if any,
effect on preventing the spread of [AIDS] or in protecting the clients."'187 The court found that employees working with mentally
retarded clients who sometimes bite and scratch did not pose a
significant risk of transmitting HIV or HBV. 188 The court
concluded that such a "minuscule" risk of occupational transmission did not justify mandatory testing. 189
We believe the court's approach in Glover is correct, while the
analysis in Anonymous Fireman is mistaken. The ABA's policy
provides that "[e]mployers should not test employees for HIV
except in those extraordinarily rare instances in which an
employee's HIV status is relevant to his or her job performance,"190 but we are not aware of any occupation, even surgery,
for which HIV status is relevant to job performance. HIV simply
is not transmitted casually or through occupational contact, even
in such circumstances as fire rescue. While fire fighters and
other emergency medical workers may practice in circumstances
in which they find it impossible to protect themselves using
universal precautions, such a situation does not create a significant risk to the public-even if the worker is HIV-positive-because the worker unlikely performs one of the handful
of invasive procedures conveying any risk of transmission.
Therefore, as no justification exists for mandatory testing of
health care workers, no justification exists for such testing of
fire fighters or other emergency medical technicians.

D. Conclusions

A well-reasoned analysis of employment restrictions on HIVpositive health care workers should start by considering whether

186. 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989).
187. Id. at 463 (quoting Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retardation,
686 F. Supp. 243, 249 (D. Neb. 1988), affd, 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 932 (1989)).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 463-64.
190. See American Bar Association Policy on AIDS, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. 9, 15 (1989).
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the techniques and practices of the individual worker create a
· significant risk to patients. The best evidence to date indicates
that one can practice in every health care occupation without
posing a risk of HIV transmission to the patient. In settings
such as surgery or dentistry, in which the transmission of the
virus to a patient is physically possible, following industrystandard infection control techniques such as "universal
precautions" eliminates all significant risk of transmission from
HIV-positive workers. Moreover, applying industry standards
to all workers, whether or not they are known to be HIVpositive, increases safety to patients. Health care providers
should impose employment restrictions only on workers
unwilling pr unable to adhere to industry-standard precautions,
and regulations should focus on adherence to proper infection
control techniques and practices.
Ill. HIV-INFECTED HEALTH CARE WORKERS
AND THEIR PATIENTS

A. Informed Consent
It is well-established in every jurisdiction that administration
of health care, except in emergencies, requires the informed
consent of the patient. 191 Some authorities have extended this
informed consent doctrine to require that HIV-positive
practitioners notify their patients of their status. 192

191. See FAY A. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE§ 1.1 (2d
ed. 1990 & Supp. 1994).
192. For the most recent of these articles, see Theodore R. LeBlang, Obligations
of HIV-Infected Health Professionals to Inform Patients of Their Serological Status:
Evolving Theories of Liability, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 317 (1994), which appears as
pl'l.I1; of a symposium on AIDS law and discusses the rapidly emerging legal area of
mandatory HIV status disclosure by health professionals. LeBlang concluded that "(i]t
will be particularly important to carefully examine all new developments in state
courts, legislatures, and regulatory agencies in an effort to seek additional guidance
regarding evolving disclosure obligations in this complex and rapidly changing
environment. n Id. at 330. See also Johnson, supra note 164, at 508-34, 541 (reviewing
the differences between the CDC Guidelines and "the tort theory of the 'special
relationship' among [health care workers], medical institutions, and patients,n and
arguing that the latter "provides a more efficacious framework for hospitals and
[health care workers] to use in resolving" the problems raised by the transmission of
HIV in the health care setting); Karen C. Lieberman & Arthur R. Derse, HIV-Positive
Health Care Workers and the Obligation to Disclose: Do Patients Have a Right to
Know?, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 333, 355-56 (1992) (arguing that the "doctrines ofinformed
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Several courts have allowed patients to sue their doctors
(especially surgeons) for failure to notify them of the doctor's
HIV-positive status based on an informed consent theory. 193 In
Estate of Behringer v. Medical Center at Princeton, 194 the court
observed that a reasonably prudent patient would find the risk
of exposure to the HIV virus from his physician "material" to
the decision of whether to have the invasive procedure performed.195 After weighing the rights of the patient to know the
risks associated with the invasive procedure against the surgeon's "individual right to perform an invasive procedure as a
part of the practice of his profession," the court held that the
risks created a "reasonable probability of substantial harm" to
warrant the informed consent of the patient. 196
Although the court held in favor of the patient's right to
informed consent, it also found the hospital and the laboratory director negligent for failing to take reasonable measures to protect the confidentiality of an employee/patient
who has been diagnosed with AIDS. 197 The hospital's policies
for maintaining the privacy of medical records included placing HIV test results on the chart while simultaneously allowing the entire medical center to have access to the chart. 198
The court noted that acceptable precautions could include
securing the chart by limiting access to designated people
with a "bona-fide need to know" or by excising portions of the
record that contain HIV-related factors. 199 It is difficult to
understand how these confidentiality considerations could be
reconciled with the informed consent requirement that the
Behringer court imposed.

consent and fiduciary duty appear to provide the basis for imposing a duty of
disclosure on an infected health care worker who intends to perform invasive
procedures").
193. E.g., Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp., 887 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Kerins
v. Hartley, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), superseded, 860 P.2d 1182 (Cal.
1993), transferred, 868 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1994); Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md.
1993). While on the first appeal, the court in Kerins found that the patient could sue
his surgeon for damages from emotional distress, that decision was ultimately reversed in light of subsequent California Supreme Court precedent. See Kerins, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 621.
194. 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
195. Id. at 1283.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1273-74.
198. Id. at 1271.
199. Id. at 1273.
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In January 1992, a panel of judges in Pennsylvania allowed
a lawsuit against two hospitals. 200 One of the claims in that
case charged the hospitals with failing to inform patients of
the HIV-positive status 201 of an obstetrician-gynecologist
resident who had performed or assisted in invasive operative
procedures on 442 patients. 202 The claimants alleged that the
hospitals' duty to provide patients with information that a
reasonable patient would require to make an informed decision
includes information concerning the HIV-positive status of the
providers. 203 Likewise, in Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp., 204 Dr.
Scoles' hospital initially required that he produce documentation indicating that each patient had given her informed
consent with full knowledge of Dr. Scoles' HIV status. 205 The
hospital later reduced that requirement slightly to require that
Dr. Scoles "inform his patients of his HIV status prior to any
invasive procedure."206 When Dr. Scoles sued the hospital under
both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act for restricting his
staff privileges, the court denied the doctor's claim and found
for the hospital. 207
More recently, two Maryland patients sued their surgeon's
estate and his hospital more than one year after their operations. The patients learned, after the surgeon's death, that the
doctor had been HIV-positive and knew as much at the time
of their operations. 208 Ruling for the plaintiffs, the Maryland
Court of Appeals held that a physician's duty of care could
encompass disclosure of his HIV infection, even though the
probability of HIV transmission is extremely low. 209 In different
contexts, courts have imposed a duty of disclosure on health
care workers, particularly surgeons, who know they are HIVpositive and yet continue to operate. 210

200. Wolgemuth v. Milton S. Hershey Medical Ctr., No. 2694-8-1991 (Pa. C.P.
Dauphin County Jan. 30, 1992).
201. Id. at 17.
202. Id. at 3-4.
203. Id.
204. 887 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
205. Id. at 767.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 772.
208. Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 329 (Md. 1993).
209. Id. at 339.
210. See also Doe v. United States Attorney Gen., 34 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 1994),
reu'd, 62 F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1995). This case involved a contract between the United
States government and a health facility for performing physical examinations on FBI
agents. Id. at 782. The FBI stopped sending agents to this hospital after the hospital
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On the issue of patient notification, the CDC has taken a
middle position between mandating notification and leaving the
matter to the discretion of the health care provider. The CDC
Guidelines do not generally require notifying patients, but they
recommend that health care workers performing exposure-prone procedures notify patients of their HIV status.
The CDC Guidelines provide that HIV-infected physicians
should not perform "exposure-prone invasive procedures"
without the authority of a medical review panel and the
informed consent of the patient. 211 Similarly, the American
Medical Association (AMA) maintains that HIV-infected
practitioners have an ethical obligation to warn their patients
of the risks of transmission, and requires doctors to obtain the
patient's informed consent before performing invasive procedures.212 Although the great majority of state health department guidelines have rejected routine notification of prospective patients, a few have required notification prior to "exposure-prone procedures. "213
After analyzing these competing perspectives, we believe that
using the "informed consent" doctrine to require disclosure of
a surgeon's HIV status is mistaken. Requiring practitioners
with HIV to disclose their status to patients goes beyond the
ordinary requirements of informed consent in several respects.
First, informed consent has never required an affirmative
disclosure by the physician of all factors in her background
that might involve risk to the patient. 214 Indeed, the common

refused to give it information about a rumor that one of the hospital's doctors was
HIV-positive. Id. at 783. While the court enjoined the FBI from breaking its contract
with the facility, the court held that the facility's refusal to provide adequate
information about the risk of HIV transmission precluded Dr. Doe from recovering
damages. Id. at 786. Specifically, the court held that, under§ 501 of the Rehabilitation
Act, the question whether a person with an infectious disease is "otherwise qualified"
requires an "individualized inquiry into the nature, duration, and severity of the risk·
[of HIV transmission), as well as the probabilities" of transmitting the disease. Id.
at 784 (citing School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1987)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). By refusing to provide information, Dr. Doe blocked this inquiry and
thus could not recover damages for his claim of discrimination. Id. at 786.
211. CDC Guidelines, supra note 3, at 5.
212. Gostin, supra note 71, at 304.
213. See ELISE GOUTIER, THE LEGAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF HIV-INFECTED
HEALTH CARE WORKERS 17-18 (1993).
214. Under the common law, informed consent has been read to require disclosure
of either: all information a reasonable practitioner would disclose under the circumstances, see, e.g., Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11, 19 (Mo. 1960) (holding that
doctors owed a duty to inform the patient of possible, serious collateral hazards of a
treatment where there existed a rather high incidence of such hazards), Natanson v.
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law notions of informed consent do not require disclosure of
facts about how well-rested the practitioner is, his history of
alcohol intake, his emotional health, or his medical school
grades. 215 Such factors. probably pose a more statistically
significant risk to the patient's health than a surgeon's HIV
status. Also, informed consent has never served as a vehicle to
pry into the physician's otherwise private affairs. 216
Rather than requiring disclosure about the practitioner,
informed consent requires disclosure about the proposed
procedure and its significant risks. Medical negligence provides
the legal redress if the practitioner negligently performs a
procedure that the patient chose after informed _consent. A
negligence standard is more appropriate in this area than one
of informed consent because it allows recovery when a legal
wrong occurs independent of the fact that a health care worker
was HIV-positive, 217 such as when the practitioner has fraudulently misrepresented his health status. 218

Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1105 (Kan. 1960) (holding that a physician must disclose
information that a reasonable medical practitioner would disclose under the same or
similar circumstances in order to determine whether a patients has given "intelligent
consent" to a proposed form of treatment); or all information a reasonable person in
the patient's circumstances would find relevant to deciding whether to undergo
treatment, see, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9-10 (Cal. 1972) (holding that the
physician's overall duty to the patient includes a "duty ofreasonable disclosure of the
available choices with respect to proposed therapy and of the dangers inherently and
potentially involved"). While the informed consent doctrine recently was extended to
require disclosure of a doctor's economic interest in his patient's organs or tissues,
see, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479, 483 (concluding that
"a physician must disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient's· health,
whether research or economic, that may affect the physician'sjudgment"), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 936 (1991), it has never been extended to include a doctor's personal
qualifications to perform the procedure at issue.
215. Id.
216. Id; see also Mary K. Logan, Who's Afraid of Whom? Courts Require HIVInfected Doctors to Obtain Informed Consent of Patients, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 483,
504-05 (noting that, given the recent judicial expansion of informed consent doctrine,
"(d]isclosure also may be required of those with histories of alcoholism, drug abuse,
and schizophrenic episodes, or those with cataracts or heart disease").
217. See, e.g., New York County Jury Awards Man $500,000 in Precedent-Setting
Case Ouer 'AIDS-Phobia', AIDS POL 'y & L., Mar. 4, 1994, at 1, 7-8 (describing a case
in which a Jehovah's Witness received damages for an HIV-positive blood transfusion
because of the hospital's violation of the patient's religious beliefs and because of the
patient's fear of getting AIDS).
218. In some cases courts have allowed patients to proceed with lawsuits against
surgeons who allegedly gave misleading answers to direct questions about their health.
See Kerins v. Hartley, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621 (Cal. Ct. App.) (reversing summary judgment
for defendant physician, allowing patient to try to prove that the physician's failure to
reveal that he suffered symptoms related to HIV when asked about his health resulted
in compensable damages), transferred with directions to vacate and reconsider, 868 P.2d
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In addition, the consequences ofrequiring patient notification
can be devastating for an employee. Patient notification would
breach the confidential nature of the employee's HIV status.
Once disclosed, knowledge of the HIV status often spreads
quickly, ruining the worker's career. Moreover, studies suggest
that the majority of patients do not want to be treated by
HIV-infected providers. 219 Further, those infected with HIV
may face discrimination for nonoccupationally related reasons. 220 Thus, any balancing that considers the health care
professional's personal rights should be resolved in favor of
voluntary disclosure, rather than mandatory patient notification.
Finally, notification of patients is unnecessary in light of the
CDC's findings that the risk of HIV transmission in the health
care setting is infinitesimal. 221 Testimony before the ABA AIDS
Coordinating Committee suggests that if a review panel has
authorized an infected health care worker's performance of
"exposure-prone invasive procedures," there is no public health
need to disclose the fact of HIV infection to the worker's patients.222 Proper infection control procedures should allow HIVpositive health care workers to continue to perform their jobs
safely and make mandatory disclosure unnecessary.
B. Post-Treatment Disclosure
In situations where informed consent is not possible because
the practitioner did not know she was HIV-positive at the time,
it has been suggested that health care providers have a duty
to inform patients of their HIV status after the treatment is

906 (Cal. 1994). This decision was ultimately reversed. Kerins v. Hartley, 868 P.2d 906
(Cal. 1994). See also K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 564 (Minn. 1995) (holding that
the question as to whether consent to a medical examination was induced by the doctor's
misrepresentation about his health should go to the jury).
219. Barbara Gerbert et al., Physicians and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome:
What Patients ThinkAboutAcquiredlmmunodeficiency Virus in Medical Practice, 262
JAMA 1962, 1971 (1989) (citing research results which indicate that 60% of those
surveyed do not believe that HIV-infected surgeons should continue to work).
220. See generally Sullivan, AIDS Law, supra note 11, at 276 (citing a report by
the National Commission on AIDS which suggests that HIV cannot be understood
"outside the context of racism, homophobia, poverty, and unemployment").
221. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
222. ABA, Chicago Hearing, supra note 12, at 18.
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completed. 223 Access to one dentist's records was granted under
the "inherent authority [of public health officials] to protect the
public health and study the epidemiological nature of an
epidemic ofHIV."224 No informed consent rationale applied, but
the court found a need for disclosure for public health reasons. 225 In granting access, the court decided that the confidentiality rules which govern public health officials would protect
the patient's and the dentist's privacy. 226
But some courts have found that the need for post-treatment
disclosure supersedes any confidentiality interest that the
doctor or prior patients may have in concealing their HIV
status. In Doe v. Hershey Medical Center, 227 the Pennsylvania
Superior Court allowed two hospitals to disclose to affected
patients and certain colleagues that a resident physician who
participated in their surgical procedures was HIV-positive. 228
The patients were offered the opportunity for counseling and
testing by the hospitals. 229 Viewing the risk of HIV transmission to be "high," the court concluded that the affected patients'
right to know the risks attendant to the physician's HIV status
outweighed the physician's right to confidentiality with respect
to their medical records. 230
In addition to post-treatment disclosure, some states have
enacted statutes allowing access to HIV information, and even
mandatory testing of an exposing individual, following
occupational exposure to blood or other bodily fluids that may
transmit HIV. 231 Such occupational exposures commonly take
the form of exposure to the blood of a patient, although the
rarer situation of a patient's exposure to the blood of a health
care worker may also be regulated. Of the state laws on this
topic, a few states 232 require that a "significant exposure" occur

223. See, e.g., infra notes 227-30.
224. McBarnette v. Feldman, 582 N.Y.S.2d 900, 906 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
225. Id. at 905.
226. Id.
227. 595 A.2d 1290 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), affd, 634 A.2d 159 (Pa. 1993).
228. Id. at 1302.
229. Although the court allowed disclosure of the possible transmission, it never
permitted Dr. Doe's name to be revealed to the public. Id. at 1301.
230. Id. at 1302.
231. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§§ 199.65-.67 (West Supp. 1995); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 19a-582 (West Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN.§ 31-22-9.2 (1991); OR.
REV. STAT. § 433.075 (1993).
232. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 199.65 (requiring notification of patient's HIV
infection status when there is significant exposure); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-
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to trigger the state mandate Of testing or disclosure. 233
We believe that post-notification to patients about possible
exposure to HIV from a health care provider is warranted only
in certain limited circumstances. 234 Such circumstances would
arise where transmission from the provider to at least one
other patient has occurred, where the patient to be notified has
had a substantial exposure to the provider's blood or body
fluids, or where the medical care was accompanied by a significant violation of infection control practices such as those in the
CDC's universal precautions, which thus created a significant
risk of a substantial exposure.
Similarly, we believe that state laws mandating testing of an
exposing person or requiring disclosure of that person's HIV
status go too far. Especially where no significant exposure has
occurred and HIV transmission is consequently unlikely,
revealing an individual's HIV information or testing the blood
of an individual without consent outweighs any benefit to the
potentially infected person. A voluntary HIV test of the exposed
individual would yield most of the information gained from
testing or disclosing HIV information from the exposing individual. Moreover, medicine cannot do anything to prevent HIV
infection even if one knows whether the fluid came from someone who was HIV-positive.
Finally, voluntary educational mechanisms have proven
highly effective for encouraging the exposing person to consent
to testing and for informing the exposed individual of the
attendant risks. For these reasons, we do not believe that

582(e)(5) (West 1995) (allowing testing if a significant exposure has occurred); see also
Pennsylvania High Court OKs Disclosure in Case Involving HN-Infected Physician,
AIDS POL'y & L., Nov. 26, 1993, at 1, 2 (discussing Pennsylvania Department of
Health policy statement that "retroactive notification of a patient is only indicated
if evidence of significant exposure to the patient has occurred").
233. For example, it is possible that spilling blood on intact skin would not be a
significant exposure, whereas a massive spray of blood into mucous membranes or
cut skin could be biologically significant (i.e., an exposure to bodily fluids in which
transmission of HIV is at least biologically possible).
234. Where a patient was infected with HIV from a source other than a health care
provider, no privacy or confidentiality issues are raised and the provider is then
clearly under a duty to inform the patient of the risk that the patient was infected
with HIV. See Reisner v. Regents of Univ. of California, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding that a doctor had a duty to warn a girl that her blood transfusion
contained HIV-positive blood in a suit raised by a later boyfriend of the girl who had
contracted HIV from her through sexual contact); DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester
County, 583 A.2d. 422 (Pa. 1990) (holding that a physician owes a duty of care to third
parties where the physician fails properly to advise the patient and the patient,
r.elying on the advice, spreads a communicable disease to the third party).
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mandatory testing or forced disclosure of the exposing individual is justified.

C. AIDS Phobia Cases in the Health Care Setting.
The so-called "AIDS phobia" litigation 235 also raises the issues of informed consent and disclosure by health care workers
with HIV. "AIDS phobia" litigation is conducted within the
framework of a body of tort law in most jurisdictions relating
to the recoverability of emotional distress damages for risk of
· future disease. 236 Such cases have allowed plaintiffs to recover
damages for either the plaintiff's present risk of contracting
the disease in the future or for the plaintiff's mental distress
and anxiety about the possibility of the future ailment. 237 The
rules for deciding such cases are not uniform among all jurisdictions, with some requiring an actual exposure to a disease
agent, while others allow a recovery for a statistically significant degree of risk. 238
In "AIDS phobia" litigation, individuals who may have been
exposed to HIV have sued based on their fear of exposure or
their risk of contracting the disease. 239 Courts have rejected such
claims in a majority of these cases, requiring that plaintiffs
show actual exposure or transmission of HIV for recovery. 240 In

235. See, e.g. Marriot v. Sedco Forex Int'i Resources, Ltd., 827 F. Supp. 59, 74-75
(D. Mass. 1993) (summarizing state law cases which have addressed emotional
distress claims for the fear of contracting AIDS); Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 810
."F. Supp. 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (confronting for the first time in the circuit the question
of"whether the fear of contracting AIDS can form the basis of a cause of action under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act"), affd, 31 F.3d 1197 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 727 (1995); Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (involving
earliest usage of term AIDS phobia to describe such litigation).
236. See Logan, supra note 216, at 494-96. See also supra note 235 and infra note
241
237. See, e.g., Jones v. United R.R., 202 P. 919 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921) (allowing
jury instructions on damages for a reasonable apprehension of future disability or
deformity resulting from injuries sustained by plaintiff in cable car accident). But see
Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1393-94 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (holding that allowing
an AIDS phobia tort without demonstration of actual exposure or significant risk is
impractical and would result in an additional cause of action in every case of adultery
because the spread of AIDS provides a risk, however small, of contracting the disease
any time one "deviate[s) from the marital nest">'.
238. See infra notes 240-43.
239. E.g., Marchica, 31 F.3d at 1202-04.
240. See, e.g., Burk v. Sage Prod., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(rejecting paramedic's claim for fear of HIV infection after a needle-stick from a used
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some cases, courts have required a showing of actual exposure
plus a likelihood of developing AIDS before allowing recovery
for emotional distress damages. 241 However, a few cases have allowed emotional distress recoveries where the risk of HIV
transmission was significant, for example where sexual partners
had unprotected sex with multiple partners. 242
In the health care environment, a number of courts have
allowed recovery in instances where plaintiffs have not tested
positive for HIV but where they also had alleged negligent and
significant exposure to HIV2 43 or negligent breach of industry

syringe); Kerins v. Hartley, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 178 (Cal. Ct. App.) (holding on
remand that a statistically insignificant chance that plaintiff contracted AIDS from
surgeon precluded recovery of emotional distress damages for fear of AIDS),
transferred with directions to uacate and reconsider, 868 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1994); Barrett
v. Danbury Hosp., 654 A.2d 748, 749 (Conn. 1995) (involving a patient exposed to
blood during rectal examination); Brzoska v. Olson, No. 284, 1995 Del. LEXIS 339,
at *20 (Del. Sept. 8, 1995) (denying recovery for fear of contracting AIDS from a
dentist who later died of AIDS absent a showing of any physical harm); Griffin v.
American Red Cross, Civil Action No. 93-5924, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16,838, at *4
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (denying recovery to plaintiff for "fear of AIDS" were plaintiffs fear
only lasted 24 hours); Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125, 126 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)
(providing no recovery for hospital employee bitten by inmate where there was no
proof that inmate was HIV-infected and employee was HIV-negative); Doe v. Doe, 519
N.Y.S.2d 595, 598 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (denying recovery to the wife in a divorce
action where she made no allegation that her husband was HIV-positive and that she
had contracted HIV); Lubowitz v. Albert Einstein Medical Ctr., 623 A.2d 3, 5 (Pa.
1993) (denying recovery where plaintiff-wife in an in vitro program was told that the
blood she received was HIV-positive, although the blood proved to be HIV-negative
after additional testing); Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs., Inc., 868
S.W.2d 585, 594 (Tenn. 1993) (holding that a plaintiff could have no recovery for fear
of exposure to AIDS because she was unable to show actual exposure to HIV and
tested HIV-negative after suffering a needle-stick in hospital); Funeral Servs. by
Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 79, 85 (W. Va. 1991) (rejecting
a mortician's claim of fear of HIV transmission where exposure to HIV was not
alleged).
241. See Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 31F.3d1197, 1204-06 (2d Cir. 1994) (surveying the "fear-of-developing-AIDS cases"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 727 (1995); Harper
v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 808 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (holding that
the law does not recognize recovery for emotional distress resulting from fear of an
unproven event); Petri v. Bank ofN.Y., 582 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (holding
that recovery for exposure to HIV without transmission would be based on uncertainty
as the specter of becoming infected and developing AIDS is too remote).
242. Cf Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (holding that
evidence of high-risk sexual activity may be relevant to a cause of action for wrongful
transmission); Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 881 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (involving a wife's
claim against adulterous husbancj and holding that there exists no actionable right
to exclusive sexual intercourse with a spouse and that wife's fear of contracting
sexually transmitted diseases was not actionable absent showing that she was actually
exposed to these diseases).
243. See, e.g., Mariott v. Sedco Forex Int'l Resources, Ltd., 827 F. Supp. 59 (D.
Mass. 1993) (involving a claim by oil rig worker who was inoculated with a vaccine
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standard precautions regarding HIV transmission. 244 For example, a New York court has held that the risk of infection was
significant where there existed circumstantial evidence, such as
a discarded hypodermic needle, of exposure to HIV infection. 245
Cases such as this one, which involve a significant and unnecessary exposure to an HIV source, contrast sharply with situations
in which HIV-positive providers use industry standard precautions which create no significant risk to the patient. These cases
appear to follow the majority rule outside the health care
setting, requiring some negligence or significant exposure before
holding a health care provider liable for emotional distress
caused by a patient's fear of contracting AIDS. 246
A few cases, however, have allowed patients to recover damages for emotional distress where the patient learned after surgery
that the surgeon was HIV-positive, even though there had been
no actual exposure to the blood of the surgeon and standard
industry precautions had been followed. 247 The most notable
example is Faya v. Almaraz, 248 a Maryland decision in which the
court allowed plaintiffs to sue for their fear of contracting HIV
even though they "did not identify any actual channel of transmission of the AIDS virus." 249 In allowing the case to proceed,
the court mentioned the Acer situation as a factor establishing
that it was objectively reasonable for the plaintiffs to fear HIV

contaminated by HIV and holding that the worker "exhibited compensable emotional
damage under the Jones Act and the general maritime law for his fear of contracting
AIDS"); Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991)
(allowing a police officer who was bitten by an HIV-infected patient to recover for
emotional distress even though police officer subsequently tested HIV-negative);
Corrections Officer Can Sue Hospital Over AIDS Exposure, Lower Court Rules, 3
Health L. Rep. (BNA) 365 (Mar. 4, 1994) (describing a case from the New York
Supreme Court in Warren County in which the court allowed a corrections officer to
file suit against a hospital where he was sprayed with blood from an AIDS patient).
244. See, e.g., K.A.C. v. Benson, Nos. C6-93-1203, C5-93-1306, C4-93-1328, 1993
WL 515825 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1993) (involving a situation in which a surgeon
allegedly operated on patients while having open sores on his hands and not using
proper barrier techniques, even after a warning from the State Board of Medical
Examiners), rev'd, 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995).
245. E.g., Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991)
(custodian stuck by hypodermic needle in trash).
246. See Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 31F.3d1197, 1202-04 (2d Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 727 (1995); see also Maddy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 737 F. Supp.
1528, 1533-34 (denying recovery for damages from emotional distress where plaintiff
was not exposed to toxic substance and where plain tiff manifested no physical injury).
247. E.g., Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196 (Alaska 1995); Barrett v. Danbury
Hosp., 654 A.2d 748, 759 (Conn. 1995) (Berdon, J., dissenting).
248. 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993).
249. Id. at 336-37.
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transmission in a health care setting. 250 However, the Maryland
court overlooked a crucial distinction from the Acer case;
Dr. Acer had used infection control procedures that had been
manifestly below the industry standard. 251 By contrast, the
surgeon in Faya followed normal industry precautions which
make the risk of HIV transmission from an HIV-infected surgeon to his patient immeasurably low. 252
We believe that the Maryland court erred in upholding the
reasonableness of emotional distress damages in circumstances
where the risk of transmission is as low as that which exists in
the case of. a properly practicing surgeon. Emotional distress
damages should be recoverable based upon a showing that
infection control procedures were substandard. Courts agree that
a patient's fear must be reasonable before allowing recovery on
an AIDS phobia tort. Given the low risk of contracting HIV from
a medical professional who follows proper infection control
procedures, a person's fear that she has contracted AIDS from
an HIV-positive doctor is not objectively reasonable unless she
identifies a specific route of infection or offers evidence that the
health care provider did not follow proper infection control
procedures. 253
In contrast to the opinion in Faya, we believe that the Delaware Supreme Court recently suggested a better approach in
Brzoska v. Olson. 254 It held that a patient cannot recover for fear
of contracting AIDS from a dentist who later died of AIDS,

250. Id.
251. CDC, Transmission of HN Infection-Florida, supra note 1, at 27.
252. Faya, 620 A.2d at 336.
253. See, e.g., Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(stating that "Pennsylvania case law supports the position that plaintiff must show
exposure to the AIDS virus before he can recover"); Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125
(N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (denying a claim of an x-ray technician who was bitten by a
prison inmate though there existed no evidence that the inmate had AIDS); Ordway
v. County of Suffolk, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1016-17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (denying
recovery against surgeon, with "no broken glove, pierced skin, patient bite, etc., which
distinguishes the operations in question from any other"); McBarnette v. Feldman,
582 N.Y.S.2d 900, 907-08 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (declining certification ofa class action
by patients against the estate of an HIV-infected dentist because of differences among
the patients, including possible differences in practice ofinfection control procedures);
Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (denying claim of wife against
adulterous husband where she could not establish exposure to AIDS); Funeral Servs.
by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 79, 84 (W. Va. 1991)
(concluding that if "a suit for damages is based solely on the plaintiffs fear of
contracting AIDS, but there is no evidence of an actual exposure to the virus, the fear
is unreasonable and this [c]ourt will not recognize a legally compensable injury").
254. No. 284, 1995 Del. LEXIS 339 (Del. Sept. 8, 1995).
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absent a reasonable fear of exposure to AIDS. 255 However, the
court specifically held that a fear of AIDS is reasonable only if
the patient has had an actual exposure to HIV.
It is unreasonable for a person to fear infection when that
person has not been exposed to a disease ....
AIDS is a disease that spawns widespread public
misperception based upon the dearth of knowledge concerning HIV transmission. Indeed, plaintiffs rely upon the
. ~egree of public misperception about AIDS to support their
claim that their fear was reasonable. To accept this argument is to contribute to the phobia. Were we to recognize a
claim for the fear of contracting AIDS based upon a mere
allegation that one may have been exposed to HIV, totally
unsupported by any medical evidence or factual proof, we
would open a Pandora's Box of "AIDS-phobia" claims by
individuals whose ignorance, unreasonable suspicion or
general paranoia cause them apprehension over the slightest
of contact with HIV-infected individuals or objects ....
In sum, we find that, without actual exposure to HIV, the
risk of its transmission is so minute that any fear of contracting AIDS is per se unreasonable. 256
Accordingly, a surgeon or dentist with HIV should face the risk
of damages for emotional distress only when that medical
professional did something professionally negligent, such as
performing a medical procedure without following proper
infection control procedures, and should not face the risk of such
damages merely as a result of his status of being HIV-positive.

D. Advertising of Negative HIV Test Results
Some health care workers, particularly dentists, advertise the
fact that they have tested HIV-negative. 257 Such advertisements

255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See, e.g., AIDS Tests for Health Caregivers?, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 10, 1992,
at 27 (describing a telephone listing service called"AIDS Negative Professionals Inc.,"
that charges health care workers up to $99 a year to be listed as HIV-negative).
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fuel public fear and misunderstanding with respect to HIV and
the possibility of its transmission in the health care setting; they
also lead to further discrimination against persons with HIV.
Even if an advertisement refers more precisely to "negative HIV
test results," rather than to "negative HIV status," the object of
the advertisement seems to remain the same: to. convince
prospective patients that the health care worker is free of HIV
infection.
Although an advertisement may be accurate as of the time of
the HIV test, the fact may later prove false because the test only
provides information regarding an earlier moment in time, due
to the "window periOd" and subsequent risks of exposure. 258 In
1991, the Council on Ethics, Bylaws and Judicial Affairs of the
American Medical Association adopted a code of ethics provision
stating that advertisement to the public of HIV-negative test
results without conveying additional information which clarified
the scientific significance of this fact is a misleading omission. 259
The ABA AIDS Coordinating Committee does not believe that
these advertisements provide a significant service to patients
and, for that reason, opposes the practice of advertising negative
HIV status.

E. Refusal to Treat Patients Who Refuse to Disclose Their
HN Status to Health Care Professionals
Some physicians and facilities have declined to treat patients
who would not disclose their HIV status. 260 This has resulted in
several recoveries by patients against facilities for discriminatory refusal to treat patients with HIV. 261 In addition, a
statute that would have allowed a physician to test a "high-risk"
patient for HIV without the patient's consent has been declared
unconstitutional. 262
258. See supra note 71 (discussing definition of "window period").
259. ABA, Chicago Hearing, supra note 12, at 125.
260. E.g., Miller v. Spicer, 822 F. Supp. 158, 160-61 (D. Del. 1993).
261. E.g., Glanz v. Vernick, 756 F. Supp. 632 (D. Mass. 1991); Doe v. Jamaica
Hosp., 608 N.Y.S.2d 518 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); California Emergency Clinic Settles
with HN-Patient It Refused To Treat, 2 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 47 (Dec. 9, 1993); see
also Mauro A. Montoya, Jr., If I Tell You, Will You Treat Me?, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
363 (1994) (discussing disclosure of HIV status to health professionals and describing
incidents and personal feelings about medical profession's failure to treat author and
other HIV-positive patients).
262. Hill v. Evans, No. 91-A-626-N, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19878, at *10 (M.D. Ala.
Oct. 7, 1993).
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Questions about a patient's HIV status are an appropriate
part of a medical history work-up, but any patient should be
entitled to refuse to disclose this information in the interests of
personal privacy and because of the risk of discrimination
including the risk of a discriminatory refusal to receive medical
treatment. Practitioners should take the same "universal
precautions" whether or not the patient is known to be HIVpositive because many patients who are HIV-positive are not
aware of their infection. 263
The ABA has adopted a policy that health care providers
should not refuse to treat or limit treatment because of an
individual's actual or perceived HIV status, and an HIV test
should not be routinely required as a condition for health care
treatment. 264 Several other authorities support the ABA's policy
statement on this point. A federal court recently issued the first
decision in a suit brought by the United States Department of
Justice (DOJ) under the Americans With Disabilities Act
(ADA). 265 The court granted summary judgment against a
Louisiana dentist who refused to treat patients with AIDS and
found that such a refusal to treat violated the ADA. 266 Since it .
is unlawfulto refuse to treat an HIV-positive person under the
ADA, it should also be unlawful to require disclosure of HIV
status prior to treatment because the fact of HIV infection does
not lead necessarily to a risk of transmission. In addition, the
ABA has taken the position that HIV testing should be
conducted only after informed consent. 267 We believe that
consent procured under the veiled threat that health care
treatment will be withheld constitutes coerced consent and,

263. But see Court Rejects Discrimination in Use of Safety Precautions with HIV
Patient, 2 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 47 (Dec. 9, 1993) (describing a case from New York
in which the court "ruled" that an "employer whose workers took universal precautions to protect themselves while performing dental work on an HIV-positive patient
did not unlawfully discriminate against the patient").
264. American Bar Association Policy on AIDS, supra note 190, at 12, §§ D.2 & E.2.
265. United States v. Morvant, No. 93-3251, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3379 (E.D. La.
Mar. 22, 1995).
266. Id. at *33; see also D.B. v. Bloom, 896 F. Supp. 166 (D.N.J. 1995) (entering
a default judgment against a defendant dentist and finding the dentist in violation
of the ADA for failing to treat a plaintiff solely because of the plaintiff's HIV-positive
status); Woolfolk v. Duncan, 872 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (denying summary
judgment to defendant dentist who refused to treat HIV-positive patient, and allowing
plaintiff to proceed with claim of violation of both the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act); cf Mary A. Crossley, Of Diagnosis and Discrimination, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1581,
1602 (1993) (noting that the prohibition on discriminatory refusal to provide medical
treatment to people because of HIV infection includes such refusals to treat infants).
267. American Bar Association Policy on AIDS, supra note 190, at 12, § E.2.
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therefore, is not consistent with the requirement of voluntary,
informed consent. 268

F. Conclusions

Informed consent is a legal concept which requires health
care workers to disclose to patients medically relevant information concerning the risks of any procedure that the patient
may undertake. Personal facts about a health care provider ·
have never been included among the types of information
which the law requires a health care worker to disclose-even
where those facts, such as lack of sleep or personal trauma,
may indeed affect the patient's care. Given the infinitesimal
risk of HIV transmission in the health care setting, the HIV
status of a health care worker does not constitute the type of
information that a health care worker should be required to
disclose to a patient either before or after performing a
noninvasive medical procedure.

IV. INSURANCE

As the foregoing cases illustrate, statutes provide and courts
recognize that discrimination against HIV-infected health care
workers in their employment is unlawful. 269 However, health
care workers (and workers generally) continue to face discrimi- .
nation in their ability to obtain and enjoy some fringe benefits
of employment-specifically, medical and other insurance
coverage-as a result of HIV infection. In late 1994, the
Chicago director of the EEOC noted that one-fourth of the suits
filed by the EEOC in federal courts under the ADA were filed
on behalf of AIDS patients fighting caps on their health insurance. 270

268. See supra Part Ill.A.
269. See supra Part II.
270. See EEOC Attorney Says Many ADA Charges Filed with Agency Are Reasonable Claims, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 232 (Dec. 6, 1994) (stating that the EEOC
has filed 41 ADA suits in federal courts, 25% of which have involved AIDS patients
fighting health insurance caps, and that the EEOC has not yet lost an ADA case).
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Interestingly, the insurance industry generally has recognized the low risk of HIV transmission in the health care
workplace and has not significantly altered professional
malpractice standards because of the AIDS epidemic. Avoiding
a fear-driven approach, as these insurers have done, is wise.
In the future, an approach not driven by fear also should be
legally required, because recent court decisions have extended
the ADA's antidiscrimination mandate to include insurance
companies and other providers of benefit plans. The final Part
of this Article will review these developments in the insurance
industry and the governing law.
A Insurance Against Contracting HIV Infection on the Job

In the early 1990s,. some insurers began selling policies that
provide benefits to workers who become infected with HIV in
the course of their occupation. 271 At least one commentator
viewed this development as an indication that insurers believe
that the risk of insuring health care workers is relatively
low. 272 Some policies were designed to pay only if the infection
was determined to have resulted from ajob-related injury, such
as an accidental needle-stick injury. 273 Other policies were
designed to provide coverage even without proof that the
insured became infected on the job. 274 In either case, the
advantage these policies offered was that the insured would be
entitled to benefits before incurring reimbursable medical
expenses, as required by a medical expense policy, or before
becoming disabled, as required by a disability policy.
Many of these policies provided for a lump-sum benefit. For
example, Harvard University obtained a policy that paid health
care workers $100,000 if they became infected with HIV at the
workplace. 275 The American Medical Association offered a
similar plan, offering up to $500,000 for practicing doctors and

271. See Brett Chase, Insurance Companies Meet Special Demands, 88 Bus. REC.,
Aug. 10, 1992, at 32; Sabin Russell, Insurers Peddle AIDS Policies to Health Workers,
S.F. CHRON., Nov. 30, 1992, at A16.
272. See Russell, supra note 271, at A16.
273. Id.
274. See id.
275. Insurance Companies Thld to Stem Large Payments for AIDS Exposure,
Associated Press, Oct. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
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lower amounts for residents and medical students. 276 This type
of coverage met with both praise and resistance. One commentator noted that the availability of such coverage would enable
infected health care workers to forego conducting certain procedures that may be perceived as presenting a higher risk of
transmission, 277 and also may encourage noninfected workers
to seek routine testing. 278 Other commentators worried that
offering insurance against HIV was not economically sound.
For example, Connecticut Insurance Commissioner Robert F.
Googins warned insurance companies that he would not
approve such policies. Ht;! said that insurance which is not
based on economic loss is "fraught with abuse." 279
At least one group of health care workers collectively bargained for special disability insurance for HIV infection. 280
Coverage in that case was limited to infection from workplace
incidents, but the policy provided $100,000 in disability insurance.281 The attention that HIV insurance coverage received
a year or two ago seems to have decreased. Perhaps this
decline can be attributed to a public perception that this type
of insurance coverage is no longer newsworthy or that the
coverage never captured its intended market. It is also possible
that the perceived risk of contracting HIV at the workplace is
so low that acquiring these insurance policies is not a priority
for health care workers.

B. Professional Malpractice

While public reaction to the Acer cluster282 might suggest
that professio.nal liability insurance carriers would restrict the
availability of such insurers in the health care field (perhaps
276. AMA Offers AIDS Indemnity Insurance, UPI, Nov. 13, 1991, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
277. If the risk is negligible, however, the value of this incentive is questionable.
It may be more realistic to assume that the benefit of this type of coverage is to
protect the health care worker who is prevented unjustly from practicing in the health
care field because of fear and prejudice. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying
text.
278. AIDS Policy for Doctors Hailed, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Sept. 2, 1991, at 20.
279. Id.
280. Diane E. Lewis, Brigham Nurses Win HIV Policy; $100,000 Guarantee for
Those Infected, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 29, 1992, at 69.
281. Id.
282. See supra Part I.C.
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requiring HIV testing before issuing or renewing policies), such
has not been the case. 283 Concerns that state adoption of the
CDC guidelines on HIV-infected health care workers also might
affect the availability of professional liability insurance appear
not to have been well-founded. 284 Insurers apparently have
been influenced more by the low risk of HIV transmission from
provider to patient than by the publicity or state regulation.
A report in the American Medical News 285 in late 1992 indicated that professional liability insurers had not increased their
rates at all because of HIV-infected physicians. 286
The report discusses HIV-related claims filed with three
malpractice insurers. 287 The insurers reported that physicians
were being sued for transmission of HIV even though federal
health officials stated that there was no substantiated case of
a physician transmitting the virus to a patient. 288 Under most
policies, insurers would be required to pay to defend a negligence claim for HIV infection. That rates have not increased
due to HIV infection suggests that the relative infrequency and
low likelihood of success of these lawsuits mitigate the possible
adverse effects of paying defense costs on the professional
liability market as a whole.
.
At least one carrier is considering defending, but not indemnifying, infected physicians for claims arising from their
failure to follow CDC recommendations. 289 Other insurance
companies are considering providing disability insurance for
physicians who become HIV infected, provided that they refrain
from performing exposure-prone procedures, in accordance with
the CDC guidelines. 290
There is no indication that professional liability insurers are
either inquiring about the HIV status of physician applicants
or refusing to issue coverage to HIV-infected health care

283. See Kuvin, supra note 2, at 118; Michael R. Ragan, AIDS: Liability for Health
Care Workers and Other Emerging Doctrines (Aug. 13, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Uniuersity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
284. Ragan, supra note 283.
285. Bill Clements, No Rate Hikes for HN Claims, But Insurers Urge Caution, AM.
MED. NEWS, Oct. 12, 1992, at 16.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. See PAINTER, supra note 71, at 10.
290. Id. (citing as examples physician-owned companies in Michigan and New
Jersey offering a $100,000 insurance benefit).
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workers. 291 If certain health care workers actually presented
a higher professional liability risk (e.g., those who perform
certain types of invasive procedures), the insurer would be costjustified in charging higher premiums for those individuals. 292
Similarly, if the risk were so high that the worker would be
uninsurable, the insurer could decline to issue the coverage.
One commentator has observed that the insurer could lawfully
exclude the applicant, so long as the insurer had a "legitimate
interest in protecting the health, safety and. welfare of its
potential insureds' patients, which includes protecting the
society from the harm of an individual."293
For now, however, insurers apparently have concluded that
HN infection is not a significant risk to be taken into account
when underwriting professional liability coverage.

C. Extension of the Americans with Disabilities
Act to Cover Employee Benefits
Recently, one federal court concluded that the ADA's
antidiscrimination mandate on employers294 also applies to a
trade union that provides insurance to employees and other
individuals. In Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive
Wholesaler's Association of New England, 295 the First Circuit
held that a trade association, which provided health insurance
coverage for its members, could be treated as an employer
under Title I of the ADA because it exercised control over the
individual members' benefits. The court ruled that the insurer
must prove that any cap it placed on benefits paid to AIDS
patients was nondiscriminatory. 296 While Carparts involved a

291. Malpractice carriers, including St. Paul, Cigna, and CNA and physician-owned
insurance companies such as Illinois State Medical Insurance Exchange and MAG
Mutual, do not require HIV testing of physicians as a condition of coverage. Id. at 9.
See also GOUTIER, supra note 213, at 44 (discussing whether malpractice insurers can
require applicants to take an HIV test).
292. Ragan, supra note 283.
293. Id.
294. The ADA expands the coverage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 701-796 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), which prohibits employers that receive federal
funds from discriminating on the basis of handicap, to prohibit all employers with 15
or more employees engaged in commerce from discriminatory action. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(5)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
295. 37 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1994).
296. Id.
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self-insured company rather than a traditional insurer, this
ruling appears to confirm an earlier holding by a federal
district judge in New York that insurers are considered employers under the ADA. 297
Treating providers of health insurance as employers subjects
them to the ADA's broad antidiscrimination mandate. The ADA
prohibits an employer from: (1) limiting the access of disabled
persons to benefits, 298 (2) using pre-existing conditions to limit
access of disabled persons to benefits, 299 (3) reducing benefits
for disabled persons, 300 or (4) reducing benefits based on a
classification that has no sound actuarial basis. 301 These ADA
protections are tempered by a broad exception for bona fide
· benefit plans. The ADA states that it does not prohibit or
restrict:
(1) an insurer, hospital or medical service company,
health maintenance organizations, or any agent, or
entity that administers benefit plans, or similar
organization from underwriting risks, classifying
risks, or administering such risks that are based
on or not inconsistent with State law; or
(2) a person o·r organization covered by this chapter
from establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan
that are based on underwriting risks, classifying
risks, or administering such risks that are based
on or not inconsistent with State law; or
(3) a person or organization covered by this chapter
from establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan
that is not subject to State laws that regulate
insurance.

297. See Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Donaghey, 63 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 'I 42,846, at 78,649, 78,654 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1993) ("In making these
payments, [the insurers) are administering funds which are being distributed on
behalf of the multi-employer pension plans. In that sense I think it is clear that
Congress intended to cover them.").
298. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.5 (1994).
299. S. REP. No. 116, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1989) (Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources).
300. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.5 (1994).
301. 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the Act]. 302
In June 1993, the EEOC approved an interim enforcement
guidance (EEOC Guidance) on disability-based limitations in
employer-provided health insurance. 303 The EEOC Guidance
directs EEOC investigators to make an initial determination
of whether a challenged insurance term or provision is a
"disability-based distinction."304 A disability-based distinction
is one that singles out a particular disability or a procedure or
treatment used exclusively for treatment of a particular
disability, such as exclusion of a drug used only to treat
AIDS. 305
If the EEOC determines that an employer's insurance plan
contains a disability-based distinction, the EEOC considers the
burden of proof to have shifted to the employer306 to show that
(1) the health insurance plan is either a bona fide insurance
plan that is consistent with either the applicable state law or
a bona fide self-insured plan; and (2) the disability-based
distinction is not being used as a subterfuge to evade the
purposes of the ADA. 307
To gain the protection of the ADA bona fide benefit plan
exception, according to the EEOC Guidance, employers must
first show that a bona fide insured plan exists and pays benefits, that its terms have been accurately communicated to
eligible employees, and that its terms are not inconsistent with
applicable state law. 308 If the plan is a self-insured plan, the

302. Id. § 1220l(c).
303. (1991-1994 Transfer Binder] Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 'I 5375, at 6416 (June
8, 1993) [hereinafter EEOC Guidance]. The EEOC is currently working on final
enforcement guidelines which "will be broader than the interim guidance and will
draw on real-life problems." EEOC Official Defends Guidance on ADA and Health
Plans, [Employment Practices] Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 610, at 4 (Dec. 8, 1993).
304. EEOC Guidance, supra note 303, at 6422.
305. Id.
306. Cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (declaring
that the complainant in a Title VII action must carry the initial burden under the
statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination; the burden then
shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
treatment of the complainant), aff'd, 528 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir. 1976).
307. EEOC Guidance, supra note 303, at 6418. The EEOC places the burden of
proving a bona fide benefit plan exception on the employer because employers have
the greatest access to facts and such a standard is consistent with the imposition of
the burden. of proof on employers in Title VII policies. See EEOC Official Defends
Guidance on ADA and Health Plans, supra note 303, at 4.
308. EEOC Guidance, supra note 303, at 6420-21.
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employer need only show that the plan exists and pays benefits
and that its terms have been accurately communicated to
covered employees. 309
Once the employer has proven that a bona fide plan exists,
the employer must then show that the challenged disabilitybased distinction is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of
the ADA. The EEOC defines "subterfuge" as an exclusion of
disability-based treatment that is not justified by the risks or
costs associated with a disability. 310
The EEOC Guidance offers no single formula for determining
what constitutes "subterfuge" and instead gives a nonexclusive
list of possible business justifications. For example, an employer may show that it has not engaged .in the disability-based
disparate treatment alleged. 311 An employer can also establish
that legitimate actuarial data, or actual or reasonably anticipated e~perience, justify the disparate treatment, and that
conditions with comparable actuarial data and/or experience
are treated in the same manner. 312
The EEOC Guidance list of acceptable justifications also
includes the justification that disparate treatment is necessary
to ensure the fiscal soundness of the challenged insurance plan
so long as no feasible alternative to the disability-based distinction exists. 313 An employer may prove that the insurance
practice is necessary to prevent an "unacceptable change" in
the plan or the premiums, such as a drastic increase in
premiums or a drastic alteration to the scope of the coverage. 314
Finally, the employer may defend the denial of disabilityspecific treatment by proving through reliable scientific evidence that the treatment does not provide any benefit or
medical value. 315
A recent ruling suggests that the EEOC will not tolerate
many asserted business justifications for disability-based
distinctions. In Mason Tenders District Council Trust Fund, 316

309. Id.
310. Id. at 6421.
311. Id. That is, if a charging party alleges that a benefit cap of a particular
catastrophic disability is discriminatory, the respondent may show that its health
insurance plan actually treats all similarly catastrophic conditions in the same way.
Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 6422.
315. Id.
316. See 20 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 453 (Feb. 15, 1993).
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the EEOC regional office in New York held that a union could
not eliminate from its health insurance plan a benefit that provided for payment of expenses arising from HIV-related conditions.317 In that case, the Mason Tenders District Council
Trust Fund (Fund) amended its health insurance coverage on
July 1, 1991 to exclude payment for expenses related to HIV
infection, AIDS, and/or AIDS-related complex (ARC). 318 Later
that year, a union member with HIV sued the union, the Fund,
and related parties, claiming that the benefit plan violated the
ADA. The New York district director of the EEOC ruled that
the Fund's plan violated the ADA because it discriminated
against individuals based on their disability, rather than on
any sound actuarial justification. 319
The Fund subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action
in federal district court seeking to establish that it was not
obligated to reinstate insurance coverage for expenses related
to HIV, AIDS, or ARC. 320 In response, the EEOC filed its own
suit against the Fund on June 9, 1993, the day after it had
issued the Interim Guidance, charging the Fund with violating
the ADA. 321 This suit signaled the EEOC's determination to
define the scope of the bona fide benefit plan exception and to
enforce the provisions set forth in the guidance.
The issue to be decided in Mason Tenders is whether the
Fund denied benefits on the basis of bona fide actuarial assumptions or subterfuge. 322 In an order denying the Fund's
motion for summary judgment, the trial judge stated that, in
order to establish a violation of the ADA, the Fund's beneficiaries will have to prove that the Fund significantly affected
a person's ability to gain benefits because of the person's
disability. 323 The beneficiaries will not have to prove that the

317. See AIDS: Cutting Benefits Violates ADA, N. Y. EEOC District Director Finds,
20 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 422 (Feb. 15, 1993).
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. See AIDS: N. Y. Welfare Fund Seeks Court Order to Kill EEOC AIDS Bias
Ruling Under ADA, 20 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 563 (Mar. 8, 1993).
321. See EEOC Sues New York Benefits Fund Under ADA for Restricting Coverage,
20 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 1287 (June 14, 1993).
322. See Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Donaghey, 63 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) at 78,649, 78,650 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1993) ("The statute specifically
contains language that says you can't use the subterfuge of a fund to evade the
ADA.").
323. Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund, 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at
78,655.

SUMMER 1995]

HIV in the Health Care Setting

791

Fund had specific intent to discriminate. 324 The Fund will have
the burden of proving that the benefits were denied on the
basis of bona fide actuarial assumptions rather than subterfuge. 325
Since the EEOC issued its Guidance, one-fourth of the ADA
cases that the EEOC has filed in federal courts charge insurance plans which incorporate AIDS-based distinctions with
violating the ADA. 326 In Philadelphia, the EEOC District
Director ruled that a $10,000 lifetime cap on payment for HIVrelated medical treatment in a union health plan violated the
ADA. 327 The director concluded that the union's action constituted subterfuge because the union trustees did not consider
capping the health care plan, which originally provided lifetime
benefits up to $100,000 for any disease or condition, until a few
months after an employee made claims for AIDS-related
treatment. 328 The EEOC ultimately filed suit against the union
health plan under the ADA, but in early 1995, the plan agreed
to drop its cap on AIDS-related treatment and settled the
case. 329
In a similar matter, the EEOC brought a suit in California
against an insurance fund which placed a $5000 cap on AIDSrelated benefits while maintaining a lifetime cap of $300,000
on other catastrophic illnesses. 330 In the settlement, the
insurance fund agreed to remove the cap. 331 In March 1994, a
self-insured company in Connecticut also agreed to remove a
$10,000 cap on treatments for HIV and AIDS after the New
York office of the EEOC ruled that the cap violated the ADA. 332
Recently, at least one federal case has been brought to challenge a cap on insurance for AIDS patients under the ADA. 333
In Carparts, discussed above, the First Circuit held that this

324. Id.
325. Id.
326. See supra note 270.
327. See EEOC Philadelphia Office Says AIDS Cap Was 'Subterfuge,' Violated ADA
Provisions, AIDS POL'y & L., Oct. 1, 1993, at 1.
328. Id. at 6.
329. See Union Health Fund Will Drop AIDS Cap Under Consent Decree Reached
with EEOC, 22 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 103 (Jan. 3, 1995).
330. See Legal Settlement Requires Removal of Caps on AIDS-Related Claims, 2
Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1343 (Oct. 7, 1993).
331. See id.
332. See Information in Brief, Bus. INS., Mar. 14, 1994, at 23.
333. See, e.g., ADA, Virginia Laws Are Cited in Federal Insurance Cap Suit, AIDS
POL'y & L., Oct. 1, 1993, at 2 (describing an employee who challenged the employer's
limits on AIDS treatment reimbursements).
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self-insured trade association must prove that any cap it placed
on benefits paid to AIDS patients was non-discriminatory. 334
Few, if any, employers offering health benefit programs can
meet such a burden or the burden imposed by the EEOC Guidance. 335 A national task force report released by the District of
Columbia Bar argues that the ADA provision on subterfuge
will continue to pose practical problems for insurers and
employers and will be an ongoing point of contention. 336 The
final outcome is difficult to predict, especially because the
Carparts and McGann v. H & H Music Co. 337 decisions may
signal the beginning of a significant conflict among the circuits
concerning what insurers can proffer as viable businessjustifications.338
The EEOC Guidance gives further clarity to the ADA's application to pre-existing condition clauses. The Guidance confirms
that blanket pre-existing condition clauses that exclude from
coverage the treatment of conditions that predate an employee's eligibility for benefits do not violate the ADA. 339 Universal
exclusions from coverage of all experimental drugs or treatments also are not considered disability-based distinctions. 340
Even coverage limits on certain medical procedures for preexisting conditions do not violate the ADA. 341 The EEOC
Guidance notes that the ADA has retroactive application to
health insurance plans that were adopted prior to the ADA's
334. Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New
England, 37 F.3d 12, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1994).
335. See ADA Poses Problems for Limits on Employer-Sponsored Health Plans,
AIDS POL 'y & L., Oct. 29, 1993, at 4.
336. See id.
337. 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that reduction of lifetime medical
benefits for AIDS-related claims under self-insured plan did not unlawfully discriminate against employee and was permissive under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992) .
338. See infra notes 347-51 and accompanying text.
339. EEOC Guidance, supra note 303, at 6419; 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.5 (1995).
340. See EEOC Guidance, supra note 303.
341. See id. The EEOC Guidance suggests, however, that overly restrictive preexisting condition clauses, which exclude treatments utilized only for a discrete group
of related disabilities, may violate the ADA if the plan is not bona fide or the
provisions are found to be subterfuge. Id. Employers may continue to use such clauses
"so long as [they] are not used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes" of the Americans
with Disabilities Act. Id. The EEOC Guidance gives an example in which a hemophiliac employee sues a hypothetical company because its insurance excludes from
coverage treatment for any pre-existing blood disorders for a period of 18 months. Id.
at 6420. In this situation, the Guidance asserts, the company must prove that its
disability-specific pre-existing condition clause is not a subterfuge to avoid violating
the ADA. Id. (Example 3).
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July 26, 1990 enactment. 342 Therefore, disability-based provisions of pre-ADA health insurance plans will be scrutinized
under the same subterfuge standard as post-ADA health
insurance plans. 343
Even if employers' health insurance plans do fall under the
ADA bona fide benefit plan exception, new employees who are
HIV-infected will still have access to benefit plan coverage in
many situations. Large group health plans typically do not
inquire into the health status of plan beneficiaries as a condition of coverage, except for special circumstances, such as late
entry into the plan. 344 Small groups often underwrite the
medical condition of individual employees, but states increasingly restrict the insurers' ability to do so. 345 Even without the
protection of the ADA, therefore, many employers that offer
health benefit plans to their employees are likely to include
HIV-infected employees in the covered group.
·
Employers or their benefit plan insurers, however, may
decline coverage to an employee altogether because nothing in
either the ADA's provisions or the EEOC Guidance mandates
that an employer even offer health or life insurance benefits.
As long as the denial of coverage is based on an actuarial risk
classification, an employer may choose to decline to offer insurance to a high-risk group. 346
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA)347 also contains an antidiscrimination clause348 which
has been used to challenge reduction claim benefits stemming
from HIV-related illnesses in two recent cases involving selffunded plans. 349 In both cases, the courts held that placing

342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Underwriting late entrants is intended to avoid adverse selection by preventing
healthy individuals from opting out of the plan until they become ill. Healthy individuals
must participate so that the plan can spread the risk of covering those who are sick.
345. See NATIONAL Ass'N OF INS. COMPANIES, 1 OFFICIAL N.A.l.C. MODEL INSURANCE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 115-1, 115-7 (1995).
346. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (Supp. V 1993).
347. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. V 1993)
348. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
349. See McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that a
reduction of lifetime medical benefits for AIDS-related claims under a self-insured
plan did not unlawfully discriminate against employee and was permissible under
ERISA), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992); Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 773 F. Supp.
416 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (holding that modification of an employer-based self-insured plan
to include a cap of $25,000 for AIDS-related claims did not violate the provision
prohibiting discriminatory conduct under ERISA where the health benefits were
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caps on AIDS benefits in employee benefit plans did not constitute illegal discrimination with respect to benefits under
ERISA. 350 This approach clearly contrasts with that.discussed
above under the ADA, which was most recently affirmed in
the First Circuit's decision in Carparts, which suggested that
it may be unlawful to cap the amount of benefits to be received by an insured suffering an HIV-related illness. 351
C. Conclusion

The impact of HIV on health care workers' access to insurance appears to be about the same as that for most other
professions. Nothing suggests that HIV-infected health care
professionals have poorer access to insurance coverage than
their noninfected colleagues as a result of HIV. Such is as it
should be, because the ADA's antidiscrimination mandate
applies to insurers. Courts and the EEOC should continue to
apply the ADA to insurers, and interpret the exception for
bona fide benefit plans narrowly, not only on behalf of
patients, but also on behalf of health care workers.
If the courts do so, the myth that insurers have a special
business justification for discriminating against HIV-positive
patients will be debunked and insurers will be treated more
like employers. Employees with HIV or other terminal conditions may require expensive medical treatment which will
affect the cost of health benefit plans, but employers should
not be permitted to contain costs by limiting coverage for
HIV-infected health care workers and other employees. The
Carparts and Mason Tenders cases suggest that, in attempting to contain costs, employers and insurers alike must be
careful not to discriminate based on HIV status.
·
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Fear of HIV infection has caused some policymakers to
respond to isolated events like the Acer cluster with calls for

nonvested and contingent), aff'd, 984 F.2d 394 (11th Cir. 1993).
350. McGann, 946 F.2d at 408; Owens, 984 F.2d at 400.
351. Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's
England, 37 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1994).
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sweeping solutions such as mandatory HIV testing of all
health care workers. Based on its research, extensive hearings, and consistent with the judgment of medi~al professionals and on current medical knowledge, the ABA AIDS
Coordinating Committee does not believe that mandatory
testing or forced disclosure of the HIV status of health care
workers is the proper solution to the problem of preventing
HIV transmission in the health care system. While such
solutions respond to the well-publicized fear of becoming
infected with HIV from health care workers, they are not
responsive to the scientific facts about the tiny risk of HIV
transmission from health care worker to patient. It bears
repeating that since the discovery of the Acer cluster, no
·additional cases of transmission of HIV from health care
worker to patient have been identified or even. seriously
alleged, despite significant effort to find such cases. It is clear
that health care workers with HIV present an immeasurably
small risk of transmission in most health care settings. It is
also clear that even when "exposure-prone invasive procedures" are at issue, any risk posed by an HIV-infected health
care worker can be controlled by adherence to proper infection control procedures. Legislative and regulatory concern
about HIV transmission in the health care setting is better
placed on encouraging adherence to proper infection control
procedures, including implementation standards and peer
review panels that would monitor such adherence.
Accordingly, the ABA AIDS Coordinating Committee recommends the following public policy actions to address the problems faced by HIV-infected health care workers and to combat
public fear of HIV transmission in the health care setting.
First, mandatory HIV testing of health care workers is not
warranted, and should not be a requirement of employment,
credentialling, licensure, professional liability insurance, training, or education. As the scientific literature and the ABA's
hearings demonstrated, many medical professionals agree that
the scientific data does not support mandatory testing of health
care professionals. 352 Monetary costs, the potential adverse
effects on the health care system, and the rights of individual
workers far outweigh the value of identifying infected health

352. Gostin, supra note 34, at 141 ("The current assessment of the risk that
infected [health care workers] will transmit HIV or HBV to patients during exposureprone procedures does not support the diversion of resources that would be required
to implement mandatory testing programs.").
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care workers through mandatory testing because no cost
beneficial decrease in the risk of HIV transmission is likely to
be achieved. 353
Second, with respect to informed consent, health care workers should not be required to disclose their HIV status to
patients under this doctrine. Since the risk of HIV transmission from health care worker to patient is immeasurably small
if universal precautions are employed, the fact that a procedure
is being performed by an HIV-positive individual-where the
patient would give consent to an HIV-negative individual to
perform the same procedure-should not be material to a
reasonable patient's evaluation of the risks of a medical procedure. In the case of the few procedures that are so invasive as
to involve a documented risk of HIV transmission, peer advisory panels should be put in place to discuss HIV-related health
care practice matters and proper infection control procedures.
HIV-positive health care workers should be encouraged tp
consult voluntarily on a confidential basis with such peer
advisory panels. Hospitals, health plans, and other institutions
should respect the informed medical judgments of such peer
review panels.
Third, antidiscrimination mandates, such as those set forth
by the Americans with Disabilities Act, should be uniformly
upheld. Health care workers should not face discrimination
based on their HIV status in employment or with respect to
receipt of benefits such as medical insurance. Similarly, patients should not be denied treatment based on their HIV
status, but may be required to disclose their HIV status solely
for medical reasons. Confidentiality of the HIV status of

353. See id. The CDC did not recommend mandatory testing of health care workers
for HIV and HBV on the grounds that the current assessment of risk does not justify
the cost of such testing programs. CDC Guidelines, supra note 3, at 6; see also ABA,
Chicago Hearing, supra note 12, at 87 (containing testimony of a surgeon who declined
to recommend mandatory testing of all elective surgery patients just to catch the small
number of open heart surgery patients who might benefit from such testing). A July
1991 report by the Pennsylvania Health Department estimated that it would cost $54
million annually to conduct quarterly HIV testing of the state's health care workers,
an amount more than twice the total Pennsylvania AIDS-prevention program budget.
Mandatory HIV Testing Intensifies Across America, ADVOCATE, Sept. 10, 1991, at 40.
Another 1991 study found that the cost of even one-time testing with pre- and posttest counseling for health care workers at San Francisco General Hospital would be
approximately $886,000 per year, twice the entire infection control annual budget for
that hospital. Id. at 42. A 1991 study by the AIDS Policy Center found that HIV and
HBV testing for the seven million health care workers in the United States would cost
between $350 and $525 million. Id.

SUMMER 1995)

HIV in the Health Care Setting

797

patients and health care workers should be maintained to encourage HIV-infected individuals to become tested, learn their
status, and adhere to appropriate infection control and other
practices to avoid spread of the infection.
Fourth, increasing compliance with universal precautions
should be the focus of government and private efforts to prevent HIV transmission in the health care setting. All health
care workers should be trained in universal precautions and
their adherence to these practices should be monitored by their
institutions. Regular continuing education programs should be
instituted to assist in compliance with infection control procedures.
Finally, the legal system should attempt to ensure that its
decisions uniformly recognize the truly low risk that an HIVinfected health care workers will transmit HIV to her patients.
Under the Supreme Court precedent set forth in Arline, all
individuals, including health care professionals, should not face
discrimination in employment or insurance actions based on
their HIV-positive status unless their behavior constitutes a
significant risk. While the consequences of HIV infection are
horrible, courts and_ legislators must not forget the risk of HIV
transmission from a health care worker can hardly be considered significant. In the history of HIV and AIDS, only one
medical practice has been documented as the source of HIV
transmission to patients-the office· of Dr. David Acer. Given
the extremely low risk of HIV transmission in a health care
environment where proper infection control procedures are
followed, courts and legislators must not allow health care
workers to suffer because of public fear of HIV transmission
that is not grounded in medial or scientific fact.
The AIDS Coordinating Committee does not mean for its
analysis to trivialize public fear about HIV transmission in the
health care setting. Public fear engendered by the Acer cluster
has been real. Unfortunately, that fear often has been exacerbated to unreasonable proportions by sensationalized media
reports or failures of public education about the methods and
risks of HIV transmission. Public fear of HIV transmission
from an infected health care worker to a patient simply is
unrelated to the actual risk of such transmission. From both
a public health and a legal perspective, the appropriate responses to such public concern are decisions based on scientific
evidence. Courts .and legislatures have the responsibility to
ensure that the facts about the low risk of HIV transmission
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prevail over public hysteria. As was aptly stated in the Committee's hearings, "public hysteria should never be the engine
that drives the policy process. "354 In the "battle between emotion, ethics and ... public perception"355 triggered by AIDS
phobia in the health care setting, the only thing the public has
to fear from HIV infected health care workers is fear itself.

354. ABA, Chicago Hearing, supra note 12, at 96.
355. Id.

